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ARTICLES 
THE SECURITIES LAW IMPLICATIONS OF FINANCIAL 
ILLITERACY 
Lisa M. Fairfax* 
Every financial literacy study conducted over the last few decades 
concurs: Americans, including American investors, are financially 
illiterate. This Article argues that America’s financial illiteracy poses 
a significant, widespread, and long-term challenge for our federal 
securities regime because that regime is premised almost entirely on 
disclosure as the best form of investor protection and, by extension, on 
investors’ ability to understand disclosure. By advancing a typology of 
investors and their disclosure needs, this Article further argues that 
we may have significantly underestimated the extent of the financial 
illiteracy problem based on at least two flawed assumptions. First, we 
have presumed that the financial illiteracy problem is limited to retail 
investors—individuals (as opposed to institutions) who invest directly 
in the securities markets and who represent a small segment of the 
overall investor population. However, such a presumption fails to 
sufficiently account for the literacy concerns of individuals who invest 
indirectly in the market in the form of holdings in mutual funds, 
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pension funds, and other institutions, and who comprise a substantial 
segment of the market. The second flawed presumption relates to the 
notion that disclosure is not intended for the individual retail investor. 
Many insist that disclosure is intended for sophisticated institutional 
investors and financial intermediaries who provide signals to less 
sophisticated investors about suitable investment choices. However, 
the anecdotal and empirical evidence suggests not only that our 
presumptions about the sophistication of institutional investors and 
intermediaries are debatable, but also that such actors do not perform 
their signaling function as effectively or as consistently as we 
presumed. Thus, the effort to minimize the financial literacy problem 
through reliance on these other investors is misguided. Finally, this 
Article contends that the very fact that regulators have sought to 
combat financial illiteracy for more than two decades without 
appreciable changes in financial literacy rates suggests that the 
problem may be long-term and that the reform of choice—investor 
education—may require supplementation. Based on these conclusions, 
this Article insists that we must grapple much more seriously with the 
financial literacy problem and offers suggestions about the best path 
forward. 
I. FINANCIAL ILLITERACY IN AMERICA ................................................ 1072 
A. Defining Financial Illiteracy ................................................. 1072 
1. Some Reflections on Defining Literacy ........................... 1072 
2. Testing the Cognitive Test ............................................... 1075 
B. Documenting America’s Financial Illiteracy ........................ 1077 
C. Literacy Matters .................................................................... 1083 
II. SECURITIES LAW IMPLICATIONS I: LITERACY MATTERS IN THE 
SECURITIES MARKET ..................................................................... 1085 
A. Literacy Matters in the Market ............................................. 1086 
1. The Market, Suitable Investment Choices,                 
and Literacy .................................................................... 1086 
2. Market Discipline, Efficiency, and Literacy ................... 1089 
3. Fraud and Literacy ......................................................... 1090 
B. Disclosure Has No Clothes? ................................................. 1091 
C. An Investor By Any Other Name. .......................................... 1094 
1. The Individual as Retail Investor .................................... 1097 
2. The Individual as Indirect Investor ................................. 1101 
3. The Institution and “Sophisticated” as Investor ............ 1103 
COPYRIGHT © 2018 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION 
2018] The Securities Law Implications of Financial Illiteracy 1067 
4. The Prospective Investor and Literacy Beyond the 
Securities Market ............................................................ 1105 
D. Education and its Limits........................................................ 1107 
III. SECURITIES LAW IMPLICATIONS II: THE SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS . 1112 
A. Scholarly Attention ................................................................ 1112 
B. Education Revisited ............................................................... 1113 
C. Disclosure Revisited .............................................................. 1114 
D. The Focus on Advisors .......................................................... 1116 
E. Literacy and the Exercise of Shareholder Power.................. 1120 
IV. CONCLUSION ................................................................................. 1121 
 
 
Americans are financially illiterate. This is the consensus of every 
financial literacy study conducted over the last few decades,1 despite 
studies differing not only in how they define financial literacy, but also 
in the metrics they use to measure financial literacy and the groups on 
 
1 See Marco Angrisani, Arie Kapteyn & Annamaria Lusardi, The National Financial 
Capability Study: Empirical Findings from the American Life Panel Survey 41 (2016); 
Applied Research & Consulting LLC, Financial Capability in the United States: Initial 
Report of Research Findings from the 2009 National Survey 37-41 (2009), http://www 
.usfinancialcapability.org/downloads/NFCS_2009_Natl_Full_Report.pdf [https://perma.cc/8 
AWW-L6FV] [hereinafter Financial Capability Study 2009] (finding that Americans have 
difficulty with basic financial concepts); Seth L. Elan, Fed. Research Div., Library of Cong., 
Financial Literacy Among Retail Investors in the United States 5 (2011) (noting that since 
2006, studies “have consistently found that American investors do not understand the most 
basic financial concepts”); Annamaria Lusardi, Noemi Oggero & Paul J. Yakoboski, TIAA 
Inst. & Glob. Fin. Literacy Excellence Ctr., The TIAA Institute-GFLEC Personal Finance 
Index: A New Measure of Financial Literacy 3–5 (2017), https://www.tiaainstitute 
.org/sites/default/files/presentations/2017-04/TIAA%20Institute-GF LEC%20PFin%20Index 
%20Report_2.pdf [https://perma.cc/FTC2-YJTK] [hereinafter Lusardi et al., A New 
Measure]; Annamaria Lusardi, Financial Literacy: An Essential Tool for Informed 
Consumer Choice? 2 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 14084, 2008), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w14084.pdf [https://perma.cc/TVK7-4BXV] (noting that most 
individuals lack knowledge of basic financial concepts) [hereinafter Lusardi, Financial 
Literacy]. 
An Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) study of some 
thirty countries and economies reveals that, similar to the United States, levels of financial 
literacy are relatively low around the globe. See Org. for Econ. Co-operation and Dev., 
OECD/INFE International Survey of Adult Financial Literacy Competencies 7 (2016), 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/fin/financial-education/OECD-INFE-International-Survey-of-
Adult-Financial-Literacy-Competencies.pdf [https://perma.cc/F24N-A8KM] [hereinafter 
OECD Survey]. The study found that “many adults around the world are currently unable to 
reach the minimum target score on financial knowledge.” Id. at 9. 
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which they focus.2 Most studies refer to financial literacy as the ability 
to know and understand basic financial concepts such as interest rates, 
risk, and debt.3 Some studies define financial literacy as the ability to 
effectively apply basic financial concepts when making financial 
decisions, such as choosing among investment options or managing a 
budget.4 Moreover, studies have tested a wide array of groups, including 
older adults, college students, high school students, women, different 
racial groups, and individual investors.5 Irrespective of the definition 
utilized, the metric employed, or the group studied, all the studies reach 
the same conclusion: The average American, including the average 
American investor, does not understand the most rudimentary financial 
concepts or how to effectively apply those concepts when making 
financial decisions.6 In other words, Americans are financially illiterate. 
Such a conclusion has serious implications for the federal securities 
law regime for a variety of reasons. First, and perhaps most importantly, 
the regime is premised almost entirely upon investors being financially 
literate. America’s federal securities law system reflects a deliberate 
normative preference for disclosure embodied in the oft-cited refrain 
from former Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandies that sunlight is the 
best disinfectant.7 The founders of America’s federal securities law 
regime rejected other normative models that would have relied on 
regulatory evaluation of securities in favor of one focused on disclosure 
 
2 See infra Part I Sections A and B. 
3 See, e.g., Angrisani et al., supra note 1, at 33-34; Lusardi, et al., A New Measure, supra 
note 1, at ii, 2-3 (referring to financial literacy as the knowledge and understanding of 
personal finances). 
4 Letter from David M. Walker, Comptroller Gen. of the U.S., to Chairman and Ranking 
Minority Member of S. Comm. on Banking, Hous., & Urban Affairs and Chairman and 
Ranking Minority Member of H. Comm. on Fin. Servs. (Nov. 15, 2004) [hereinafter Letter 
from David M. Walker], in U.S. Gov’t Accountability Office, Highlights of a GAO Forum: 
The Federal Government’s Role in Improving Financial Literacy 1 (2004) [hereinafter GAO 
Forum] (defining financial literacy as “the ability to make informed judgments and to take 
effective actions regarding the current and future use and management of money”); Sandra J. 
Huston, Measuring Financial Literacy, 44 J. Consumer Aff. 296, 307 & fig. 1 (2010) 
(defining financial literacy to include both a knowledge dimension and an application 
dimension, consisting of the “[a]bility and confidence to effectively apply or use knowledge 
related to personal finance concepts and products”).   
5 See infra Part I Section B. 
6 See id. 
7 See Louis D. Brandeis, Other People’s Money and How the Bankers Use It 92 (1914) 
(“Sunlight is said to be the best of disinfectants.”); see also 1 Thomas Lee Hazen, Treatise on 
the Law of Securities Regulation § 1:16, at 36–37 (7th ed. 2016) (noting that the focus on 
disclosure was deliberate).  
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to investors. The premise was that the best way to protect investors was 
to provide them with sufficient disclosure, thereby enabling them to 
make informed investment decisions.8 In this regard, the federal 
securities law regime is inextricably linked to financial literacy because 
the regime presumes investors have the capacity to sufficiently 
understand the information being disclosed to them and thus the capacity 
to make suitable investment choices for themselves.9 If most Americans 
are financially illiterate, this premise is flawed, and so is the normative 
foundation of the federal securities law regime. Second, many contend 
that market efficiency depends upon financially literate investors.10 In 
their view, the securities markets rely at least to some extent upon 
investors having the financial capacity to discipline markets by weeding 
out inappropriate investment opportunities.11 Financial illiteracy means 
that investors are ill-equipped for this task, and thus illiteracy increases 
the likelihood that our markets will be inefficient. Third, securities 
markets depend, at least in part, upon investors having the capacity to 
distinguish between legitimate and illegitimate investment opportunities 
to help detect and prevent securities and investment fraud.12 Financial 
illiteracy undermines the notion that investors can provide meaningful 
assistance in this arena. In other words, financial illiteracy runs counter 
to core presumptions, embedded in our securities system, that investors 
will have the capacity to protect themselves, discipline the markets, and 
 
8 See J. Robert Brown, Jr., The Regulation of Corporate Disclosure § 4.01 (4th ed. 2018) 
(noting that the adoption of the federal securities laws represented a deliberate choice to 
embrace the disclosure philosophy articulated by Brandies, coupled with Congress’s 
decision to decline approval of a scheme focusing on merit review); Hazen, supra note 7, 
§ 1:16 n.4, at 37 (noting that Felix Frankfurter, instrumental in shepherding the Act through 
Congress, was greatly influenced by the value of disclosure over merit regulation); id. 
§ 1.17, at 38 (noting that after considerable debate Congress “eschewed the idea of a merit 
approach” in favor of a system of full disclosure).   
9 See infra notes 114-118 and accompanying text. 
10 See Brown, supra note 8, § 4.01 (noting connection between disclosure and efficient 
pricing in the market); Hazen, supra note 7, § 1:16 nn.4, 6, at 37; Roger J. Dennis, 
Materiality and the Efficient Capital Market Model: A Recipe for the Total Mix, 25 Wm. & 
Mary L. Rev. 373, 414 (1984); Jonathan R. Macey, A Pox on Both Your Houses: Enron, 
Sarbanes–Oxley and the Debate Concerning the Relative Efficacy of Mandatory Versus 
Enabling Rules, 81 Wash. U. L.Q. 329, 329 (2003) (noting that “[t]he U.S. securities laws 
reflect the deeply imbedded assumption that timely, full, and complete corporate disclosure” 
will achieve accurate and efficient pricing of securities).  
11 Letter from David M. Walker, in GAO Forum, supra note 4, at 1. 
12 See Brown, supra note 8, § 4.01 (noting the theory that abuses could be eliminated 
through disclosure, and that duping investors would be more difficult with disclosure). 
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help guard against securities fraud. As a result, financial illiteracy poses 
a challenge to that system. 
This Article makes three contributions. First, it highlights the need to 
devote greater resources and attention to this issue. To be sure, for at 
least two decades, regulators and other market participants have both 
acknowledged and sought to respond to financial illiteracy.13 However, 
there has been a dearth of scholarly attention given to its significance. 
Second, this Article argues that financial illiteracy poses a significant, 
widespread, and long-term challenge to our current federal securities law 
regime. Indeed, the very fact that regulators and other market 
participants have been seeking to combat financial illiteracy for more 
than a decade without appreciable changes to financial illiteracy rates 
suggests that the problem may be long term or even intractable.14 Third, 
this Article argues for a fundamental shift in our response to the 
financial literacy problem. To date, most reform efforts have sought to 
tackle the financial literacy problem by focusing on investor behavior. 
This Article asserts that it has become clear that we must alter our focus. 
Financial illiteracy challenges fundamental presumptions of our system; 
the system itself must respond to those challenges. Such a response may 
require us to alter that regime to account for illiteracy at all of the critical 
stages at which investors are required to make investment decisions.  
Part I of this Article expands upon the concept of financial literacy 
and demonstrates that financial illiteracy in America is consistently 
documented by empirical evidence. Part II demonstrates the manner in 
which financial illiteracy poses significant, widespread, and long-term 
challenges to our securities law regime. This Part argues that we have 
underestimated the problem by suggesting that illiteracy is limited to a 
small segment of investors. Instead, Part II demonstrates that the 
financial literacy problem encompasses all investors—including those 
who invest directly in the market and those who invest indirectly 
through various institutions. Importantly, Part II acknowledges that 
many may discount the importance of financial illiteracy based on the 
contention that disclosure is only intended for sophisticated investors 
and financial intermediaries, who not only have the capacity to interpret 
complex financial information, but also provide signals that enable less 
 
13 See infra Part II Section D. 
14 See id. 
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sophisticated investors to make suitable investment choices.15 Part II 
demonstrates the flaws in this contention. Part II further demonstrates 
that even if investors have significantly greater financial capacity than 
noninvestors (a fact which the data does not support),16 the 
interconnectedness of our economic system means that the financial 
illiteracy of noninvestors still impacts the securities regime. In this 
regard, Part II reveals that the financial literacy problem is widespread. 
Part II also demonstrates the potentially long-term nature of the problem 
by highlighting the significant limits of investor education—the current 
reform mechanism of choice. Part III analyzes some of the securities law 
implications of the financial illiteracy problem articulated by this 
Article. The mission of the Securities and Exchange Commission (the 
“SEC”), like that of the federal securities laws in general, is to “[p]rotect 
investors[,] [m]aintain fair, orderly, and efficient markets[, and] 
[f]acilitate capital formation.”17 Financial illiteracy may undermine the 
SEC’s ability to successfully fulfill that mission. 
 
15 See infra Part II Section C. 
16  See infra Part I Section B. 
17 Sec. Exch. Comm’n, The Role of the SEC, Investor.gov, https://www.investor.gov 
/introduction-investing/basics/role-sec [https://perma.cc/3GMX-GNRZ] (last visited Mar. 
14, 2018). 
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I. FINANCIAL ILLITERACY IN AMERICA 
A. Defining Financial Illiteracy 
1. Some Reflections on Defining Literacy 
Studies differ in how they define financial literacy. Many studies 
embrace a cognitive test that defines financial literacy as the extent to 
which someone has knowledge and understanding of basic financial 
concepts.18 Other studies focus on behavior and the extent to which an 
individual can make sound financial choices.19 This Article primarily 
adopts the cognitive test for financial literacy. 
This Article acknowledges the inextricable link between financial 
literacy and financial decision making. Financial literacy is multi-
dimensional and therefore includes both an ability to understand 
fundamental financial concepts as well as the ability to understand how 
best to effectively apply those concepts when making financial 
decisions.20 An individual cannot make effective financial decisions 
without sufficient understanding of core financial concepts.21 Studies 
reveal that we cannot fully measure the understanding of financial 
concepts without testing whether an individual knows how to effectively 
apply those concepts.22 Thus, even studies that define financial literacy 
to include only a cognitive dimension acknowledge the importance of 
 
18 See Lusardi, et al., A New Measure, supra note 1, at 2. 
19 See Letter from David M. Walker, in GAO Forum, supra note 4, at 1; see also Huston, 
supra note 4, at 307 (referring to the ability to understand essential concepts and products as 
financial knowledge, which she posits is just one aspect of financial literacy, the other being 
the ability to apply financial knowledge).  
20 See Lusardi, et al., A New Measure, supra note 1, at 2 (noting that financial literacy 
enables sound and effective financial decision making); Lusardi, Financial Literacy, supra 
note 1, at 4 (noting the importance of adding data on financial literacy with data on financial 
behavior). Recognizing the importance of both concepts, some surveys do combine both 
tests. Hence, some studies refer to the combination of financial knowledge and financial 
decision making as financial capability, with financial literacy as a component of overall 
capability. See Angrisani, et al., supra note 1, at 12; FINRA Inv’r Educ. Found., Financial 
Capability in the United States 2016, at 3 (2016), https://www.usfinancialcapability 
.org/downloads/NFCS_2015_Report_Natl_Findings.pdf [https://perma.cc/786D-5S8A] 
[hereinafter Financial Capability in the United States 2016]. 
21 See Angrisani et al., supra note 1, at 12; Financial Capability in the United States 2016, 
supra note 20, at 3.  
22 See, e.g., Angrisani et al., supra at 1, at 12; Financial Capability in the United States 
2016, supra note 20, at 3.  
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studying the concepts of knowledge and decision making together in 
order to best measure an individual’s financial understanding and 
competency.23 
 However, this Article focuses on the cognitive test for several 
reasons. First, such a focus is consistent with the securities law inquiry 
of this Article, which centers on the extent to which individuals have 
sufficient knowledge of financial concepts to understand information 
being disclosed to them. Second, this focus is consistent with the 
normative underpinnings of the securities regime, which reject a focus 
on the quality of an individual’s decision in favor of a focus on the 
provision of information to ensure that individuals have the capacity to 
make appropriate decisions.24  
 Third, there may be many circumstances in which relying on financial 
behaviors as a determinant of financial literacy is problematic. This is 
because studies use certain behaviors as proxies for whether individuals 
appropriately understand the impact of their behaviors on financial 
decisions—and hence should be deemed financially literate. However, 
the use of such proxies is inexact at best. For example, studies 
acknowledge that one critical aspect of financial decision making is the 
ability to understand how best to manage debt.25 To test this ability, 
studies focus on behaviors such as whether an individual overdraws on 
her checking account, pays the minimum balance on her credit card, 
uses her credit card for cash advances, or routinely charges more than 
the maximum amount of her credit card limit.26 These kinds of behaviors 
 
23 See, e.g., Angrisani et al., supra at 1, at 12; Financial Capability in the United States 
2016, supra note 20, at 3. 
24 See supra note 8.  
25 Studies that define financial literacy in terms of the ability to make informed decisions 
around the current and future use of money focus on at least three core financial decisions: 
(1) the ability to manage current financial resources; (2) the ability to plan ahead; and (3) the 
ability to manage debt and financial products. See, e.g., Angrisani et al., supra note 1, at 12 
(noting that financial literacy encompasses managing resources to make ends meet, planning 
for the future, and managing debt and financial products); Letter from David M. Walker, in 
GAO Forum, supra note 4, at 1 (noting that literacy includes the ability to spend wisely, plan 
for the future, including for unexpected events and long-term goals such as college and 
retirement, and understand financial choices). The ability to manage debt appropriately is a 
component of financial literacy because it helps determine whether an individual appreciates 
how best to use her financial resources to experience successful financial outcomes or 
otherwise avoid serious financial distress. See Angrisani et al., supra note 1, at 25; Financial 
Capability in the United States 2016, supra note 20, at 19. 
26 See Financial Capability in the United States 2016, supra note 20, at 7, 21-22. When 
testing whether individuals can appropriately manage financial debt, researchers also focus 
COPYRIGHT © 2018 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION 
1074 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 104:1065 
subject individuals to high fees and thus may be a sign of financial 
irresponsibility.27 However, the studies cannot determine whether an 
individual is engaging in such behaviors because she does not 
understand their repercussions or because she does not have the ability 
to access products that one would deem more financially appropriate.28 
In this regard, it seems inappropriate to characterize this behavior as 
reflective of financial irresponsibility or illiteracy. 
Finally, characterizing a financial decision as appropriate or 
inappropriate (or literate or illiterate) contains a value judgment about 
individual choice that may be problematic.29 If an individual decides to 
overdraw her checking account in order to pay for a child’s college 
education, should this be characterized as an inappropriate financial 
decision? If the decision is an informed one, there is a strong argument 
that it is a misnomer to suggest that the decision is an indicator of 
financial illiteracy. Indeed, the premise of our disclosure-based federal 
securities system is that so long as individuals make an informed 
decision, we should not judge the substance of the ultimate decision.30 
From this perspective, the normative assumptions embedded in the 
federal system run counter to the notion that we should focus on the 
types of decisions people make, and instead suggest that the appropriate 
focus should be the cognitive ability to make decisions.   
For these reasons, this Article focuses primarily on the cognitive test 
for defining financial literacy. To be sure, the behavioral component 
must be taken into account, at least at some level. This is because, to a 
 
on the extent to which individuals use nonbank borrowing methods such as payday loans, 
auto-title loans or pawnshops. See id. at 25.  
27 See id. 
28 Similarly, studies indicate that planning ahead for both expected and unexpected 
financial events is a critical aspect of financial decision making, and thus financial literacy 
because it determines whether individuals can make decisions that will help ensure financial 
stability and security. See Angrisani et al., supra note 1, at 18. To test this competency, 
studies examine whether an individual saves money for retirement or child’s anticipated 
college education, or whether an individual has a “rainy day” fund (defined as three-months’ 
worth of salary) or can come up with $2,000 within a month to cover financial emergencies. 
See id. at 19; Financial Capability in the United States 2016, supra note 20, at 13. However, 
the studies cannot differentiate between individuals who do not understand the importance of 
planning ahead in these ways, and those who understand but do not have the resources for 
such planning. 
29 See Lauren E. Willis, Against Financial-Literacy Education, 94 Iowa L. Rev. 197, 
275-82 (2008) (discussing concerns related to the “blaming the consumer” mentality 
associated with financial literacy education). 
30 See supra note 8. 
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certain extent, it seems clear that financial literacy includes the cognitive 
ability to understand financial concepts as well as the ability to apply 
those concepts in various financial settings. Fortunately, the cognitive 
and behavioral tests overlap at some level. Moreover, both tests yield the 
same empirical results.31 
2. Testing the Cognitive Test  
In the context of the cognitive test, studies suggest that financial 
literacy involves understanding three core concepts: interest rates, 
inflation, and risk diversification. In 2004, Professors Annamaria 
Lusardi and Olivia Mitchell, two of the acknowledged leaders in the 
field of financial literacy, pioneered the first modules for use in testing 
financial literacy based on these three core concepts.32 In 2006, Lusardi 
and Mitchell transformed those modules into three questions aimed at 
testing competency in the three core concepts.33 Two of the questions are 
 
31 See Angrisani et al., supra note 1, at 42; Financial Capability in the United States 2016, 
supra note 20, at 3.  
32 See Elan, supra note 1, at 6 (noting that Lusardi and Mitchell have conducted focused 
research on the financial literacy issue and developed the module that has formed the basis 
for most of the financial literacy surveys); Jere R. Behrman et al., How Financial Literacy 
Affects Household Wealth Accumulation, 102 Am. Econ. Rev. 300, 301 (2012) [hereinafter 
Berhman et al., Household Wealth Accumulation] (noting that the United States Health and 
Retirement Study, designed by Lusardi and Mitchell, first tested three core financial literacy 
concepts). 
33 See Lusardi, Financial Literacy, supra note 1, at 4. Though Lusardi and Mitchell have 
refined the three questions over the years, the most recent version of the three questions is as 
follows (correct answers marked with asterisks):  
Suppose you had $100 in a savings account and the interest rate was 2% per year. After 5 
years, how much do you think you would have in the account if you left the money to grow?  
•More than $102** 
•Exactly $102 
•Less than $102 
•Do not know 
•Refuse to answer 
Imagine that the interest rate on your savings account was 1% per year and inflation was 2% 
per year. After 1 year, how much would you be able to buy with the money in this account?  
•More than today 
•Exactly the same 
•Less than today** 
•Do not know 
•Refuse to answer 
Please tell me whether this statement is true or false. “Buying a single company’s stock 
usually provides a safer return than a stock mutual fund.” 
•True 
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multiple choice and the third is a true-false question. All the questions 
enable respondents to indicate that they “do not know” the answer. 
Lusardi and Mitchell believe that these three questions, and the concepts 
they represent, are most appropriate for determining whether an 
individual possesses basic financial literacy, because the questions 
evaluate whether an individual has knowledge of fundamental economic 
concepts, competency with basic financial numeracy, and knowledge of 
risk diversification.34 The core concepts and questions developed by 
Lusardi and Mitchell have been incorporated into a number of studies 
that seek to evaluate financial literacy.35   
Researchers have developed different ways to test these three core 
concepts.36 Some studies merely reproduce the three questions.37 Others 
have developed additional questions, with some studies having as few as 
five questions,38 and others having as many as fifty questions.39 Even 
Lusardi and Mitchell have since expanded the number of survey 
questions they employ. In 2016, Lusardi and two colleagues developed a 
 
•False** 
•Do not know 
•Refuse to answer  
See Glob. Fin. Literacy Excellence Ctr., Three Questions to Measure Financial Literacy, 
http://gflec.org/wp-content/uploads/2015/04/3-Questions-Article2.pdf [https://perma.cc/VP5 
K-TZLF] (last visited Mar. 14, 2018); see also Jere Behrman et al., Financial Literacy, 
Schooling and Wealth Accumulation 9–10 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper 
No. 16452, 2010), http://www.nber.org/papers/w16452.pdf [https://perma. cc/U6CH-79AA] 
[hereinafter Behrman et al., Financial Literacy]. 
34 See Lusardi, Financial Literacy, supra note 1, at 5. 
35 See Elan, supra note 1, at 6; Lusardi et al., A New Measure, supra note 1, at 2 n.1.  
36 See, e.g., Angrisani et al., supra note 1, at 34 (using survey questions that are designed 
to determine an individual’s understanding of interest rates and how interest is calculated, 
the relationship between interest rates and bond prices, and the concept of risk 
diversification); Lusardi et al., A New Measure, supra note 1,  at 2-3 (using survey questions 
to focus on eight areas: earning, consumption, saving, investing, borrowing/managing debt, 
insuring, comprehending risk, and go-to information sources); Financial Capability in the 
United States 2016, supra note 20, at 28 (questions involving interest rates, inflation, bond 
prices, mortgages, and risk). 
37 See Behrman et al., Financial Literacy, supra note 33, at 9; Glob. Fin. Literacy 
Excellence Ctr., supra note 33 (noting that the three questions have been used in more than 
20 countries to measure financial knowledge). 
38 See Financial Capability in the United States 2016, supra note 20, at 28. 
39 The Jump$tart survey included forty-nine questions for high school students and fifty-
six questions for college students. See Lewis Mandell, The Financial Literacy of Young 
American Adults: Results of the 2008 National Jump$tart Coalition Survey of High School 
Seniors and College Students 10 (2008). Another study included twelve questions. See 
Behrman et al., Household Wealth Accumulation, supra note 32, at 301.  
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broader set of questions referred to as the Personal Finance Index (the 
“Index”) to produce a more nuanced examination of individual 
understanding of the core financial concepts in different contexts.40 
Irrespective of the number of survey questions used, each study seeks to 
measure the same thing—the extent to which individuals understand 
rudimentary financial and economic concepts. 
B. Documenting America’s Financial Illiteracy 
Regardless of how they define and measure financial literacy, studies 
uniformly conclude that Americans are not financially literate.41 To be 
sure, empirical research on financial literacy is relatively new. Thus, as a 
general matter, empirical research in this area only dates back to the 
mid-1990s.42 Those initial studies revealed a troubling lack of financial 
literacy among Americans.43 Thus, by 2004, the Government 
Accounting Office (“GAO”) raised a host of concerns about the 
“growing evidence that large numbers of Americans lack knowledge 
about basic personal economics and financial planning.”44 Such 
concerns spurred an increase in both research and attention on financial 
literacy. While the number of financial literacy programs and surveys 
increased, however, the findings have remained relatively consistent. 
In 2011, the Library of Congress, in partnership with the SEC, 
conducted a review of quantitative studies of financial literacy of retail 
investors published since 2006.45 The report analyzed ten different 
 
40 See Lusardi et al., A New Measure, supra note 1, at 2-5. While the survey began in 
2016, the study publishing the survey results was released in 2017. Id.  
41 See Angrisani et al., supra note 1, at 35 (noting that the National Financial Capability 
Study’s finding that Americans had a poor knowledge of basic financial concepts was 
consistent with the finding of prior national financial literacy studies conducted in 2009 and 
2011); Elan, supra note 1, at 1 (noting that the findings about American’s lack of basic 
financial literacy was consistent across surveys); Letter from David M. Walker, in GAO 
Forum, supra note 4, at 1 (noting the “growing evidence that large numbers of Americans 
lack knowledge about basic personal economics and financial planning”).  
42 See, e.g., Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia S. Mitchell, Financial Literacy and Retirement 
Preparedness: Evidence and Implications for Financial Education, Bus. Econ., Jan. 2007, at 
35, 38 (discussing 1995 and 1998 study that first warned of the relationship between 
financial literacy and savings and investment); Mandell, supra note 39, at 7-10 (detailing the 
first major financial literacy study of high school students).  
43 See Lusardi & Mitchell, supra note 42, at 36-39 (reviewing the existing empirical 
literature on financial literacy in the United States and around the world).  
44 Letter from David M. Walker, in GAO Forum, supra note 4, at 1-2 (pinpointing 
evidence from an AARP study and a Jump$tart survey). 
45 Elan, supra note 1, at 5. 
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studies, many of which focused on the general population, with a few 
focusing on subgroups such as women, older Americans, specific racial 
groups, and members of the military.46 The report found that the studies 
consistently revealed that American investors “do not understand the 
most basic financial concepts, such as the time value of money, 
compound interest, and inflation.”47  
Surveys conducted after the Library of Congress report confirmed 
these findings. In 2009, the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority 
(“FINRA”) conducted its first National Financial Capability Study 
(“NFC Study”), a nationwide survey aimed at measuring the financial 
capacity of Americans.48 The 2009 NFC Study found that Americans 
performed poorly on basic financial literacy questions and concluded 
that Americans lacked basic financial literacy.49 FINRA conducted 
successive surveys in 2012 and 2015, both of which confirmed the 
findings of the 2009 NFC Study.50 The 2015 NFC Study concluded that 
there were “relatively low levels of financial literacy among 
Americans.”51 The survey included five questions covering fundamental 
concepts of economics and finance.52 According to the 2015 NFC Study, 
only 14% of respondents answered all five survey questions correctly, 
while only 37% of respondents answered four or more questions 
correctly.53 This reflected a slight downward trend from previous NFC 
Studies. In 2012, 39% of respondents answered four or more questions 
correctly and 42% answered four or more questions correctly in 2009.54 
Overall, therefore, the 2015 results confirmed the findings of earlier 
FINRA studies that Americans lacked basic financial literacy.55  
A 2012 survey of a nationally representative sample of Americans 
similarly found a “lack of financial literacy and poor knowledge of basic 
 
46 See id. at 6, 20. 
47 Id. at 5. 
48 See Financial Capability Study 2009, supra note 1, at 3. The Library of Congress report 
included the first NFC Survey, but did not include analysis of the 2015 Survey.  
49 See id. at 37–41. 
 50 See Financial Capability in the United States 2016, supra note 20, at 2-3, 28. While the 
most recent survey was conducted in 2015, the study publishing the survey results was 
released in 2016. 
51 Id. at 3, 28.  
 52 See id. at 28. 
53 See id. 
54 See id. 
55 See Elan, supra note 1, at 1. 
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economic concepts among American adults.”56 Only 18% of respondents 
answered all five of the questions correctly, and only 31% answered four 
questions correctly.57 The authors of the report concluded that their 
findings revealed a general lack of literacy among Americans, consistent 
with the findings of other studies.58  
Seeking to add more depth and breadth to their surveys, in 2016, 
Lusardi and two colleagues developed the Index. The Index includes 
twenty-eight questions aimed at assessing an individual’s knowledge of 
fundamental financial concepts.59 In 2016, the Index was used to survey 
a nationally representative sample of American adults. The results of the 
survey were consistent with earlier studies, revealing that many 
Americans lack basic personal finance knowledge.60 According to the 
Index survey, the average respondent was able to answer 49% of the 
Index questions correctly.61 Sixteen percent of adults demonstrated a 
high level of personal finance knowledge and understanding, defined as 
being able to answer over 75% of questions correctly, while 20% 
showed relatively low levels of financial literacy, defined as answering 
25% or less of the questions correctly.62 
Financial literacy surveys of younger adults reflect similar findings. 
In 1997, the Jump$tart Coalition for Personal Financial Literacy (the 
“Jump$tart Coalition”) launched the most comprehensive national 
financial literacy survey of high school seniors.63 The survey was 
conducted biennially, and produced six surveys between 1997 and 
2008.64 In 1997, the average financial literacy score for high school 
seniors was 57.3%, which the survey authors defined as a “high flunk.”65 
Survey authors hoped that over time the average score would rise to a 
“passing” grade of at least 60%.66 Instead, the scores never reached the 
initial high flunk grade. The average score for high school seniors was 
 
56 Angrisani et al., supra note 1, at 2, 35.  
57 See id. at 34. 
58 See id. at 35. 
59 See Lusardi et al., A New Measure, supra note 1, at 2. 
60 See id. at 3. The survey focused on Americans ages 18 and older and concluded that 
personal finance knowledge among American adults was “modest.”  
61 See id. 
62 See id. 
63 Mandell, supra note 39, at 7. 
64 Id. at 7-8. 
65 Id. at 8.  
66 Id. 
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51.9% in 2000, 50.2% in 2002, 52.3% in 2004, and 52.4% in 2006.67 By 
2008, the financial literacy scores of high school seniors had fallen to an 
average score of 48.3%, its lowest level since the survey’s launch.68 
Collectively, the average grade for high school seniors over the life of 
all of the surveys was a failing grade.69 Indeed, only 10% of high school 
students could answer three out of the four questions correctly in the 
1997-98 survey.70 Survey authors explained that these results were 
especially troubling because they did not capture the many high school-
aged students who did not make it to their senior year, and who were 
presumably even less financially literate than the high school seniors 
being surveyed.71 The survey is consistent with the findings of later 
surveys about younger adults, all of which reveal a lack of 
understanding of core financial concepts.72 
Surveys of college students, while more promising, also paint a bleak 
picture. In 2008, the Jump$tart Coalition survey included college 
students for the first time. The survey findings revealed that college 
students had an average score of 62.2%, a passing grade, albeit barely.73 
The survey authors explained that while such scores indicated that 
college education had an impact on financial literacy, they nevertheless 
cautioned that the “bad news is that only 28 percent of Americans 
graduate from college, leaving nearly three quarters ill-equipped to make 
critical financial decisions.”74 Moreover, while college students and 
college graduates tend to outperform the general population on these 
tests, their scores are often just below or just above the baseline 
indicator for financial literacy. For example, the 2015 NFC Study 
revealed that respondents with a college education answered an average 
of 3.9 questions correctly as compared to the overall average of 3.2.75 
Such scores are comparatively better, but still below a passing grade of 
at least four questions answered correctly. 
 
67 Id. at 5. 
68 Id. at 5, 8.  
69 Id. at 5, 7.  
70 Id.  
71 Id. at 6. 
72 See Financial Capability in the United States 2016, supra note 20, at 30; Lusardi et al., A 
New Measure, supra note 1, at 7, 11.  
73 Mandell, supra note 39, at 5. 
74 Id. at 8-9. 
75 See Financial Capability in the United States 2016, supra note 20, at 30. 
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Surveys also consistently show that the financial literacy scores of 
particular groups are even more troubling. In particular, women, certain 
racial groups, and the elderly consistently perform worse than the 
general population on financial literacy tests.76 In 2008, while 64.4% of 
white high school seniors had a failing grade, 89.1% of African 
American seniors had a failing grade, 83.4% of Hispanic seniors had a 
failing grade, 77.2% of Asian seniors had a failing grade, and 88.8% of 
Native American seniors had a failing grade.77 Thus, while on average 
all high school seniors failed to achieve a passing grade, nonwhite high 
school seniors had significantly higher fail rates than their white 
counterparts. These discrepancies persist in studies of adults. Thus the 
2016 Index survey revealed that on average, whites answered 55% of 
literacy questions correctly, while nonwhites answered only 39% of 
questions correctly.78 While both groups failed to achieve the passing 
grade of 60%, whites fared better than nonwhites. In addition, 60% of 
whites answered more than half of the questions correctly, while only 
27% of nonwhites answered more than half of the questions correctly.79 
Plus, while 22% of whites answered more than 75% of the questions 
correctly, only 5% of nonwhites did so.80 Thus, albeit a relatively small 
percentage of the overall population, a higher percentage of whites 
versus nonwhites had what would be deemed a higher level of personal 
finance knowledge. These findings were consistent with financial 
literacy patterns identified in prior studies.81 In this same vein, the 2015 
NFC Study revealed that while whites answered 3.4 questions correctly, 
African Americans answered only 2.5 questions correctly and Hispanics 
and Asians answered 2.7 and 3.2 questions correctly, respectively.82 
Here again the pattern persists—no group achieved a passing grade, but 
whites performed better than nonwhites.  
A 2017 study of U.S. Hispanics (which the study defined as those of 
Mexican, Puerto Rican, Cuban, or other Hispanic descent) found 
“substantially low levels of knowledge and understanding of personal 
 
76 See Angrisani et al., supra note 1, at 35 (detailing “substantial differences” in overall 
financial literacy levels across particular demographics); Elan, supra note 1, at 1, 24. 
77 See Mandell, supra note 39, at 14. 
78 See Lusardi et al., A New Measure, supra note 1, at 7. 
79 See id. at 8. 
80 See id. 
81 See id. at 7. 
82 See Financial Capability in the United States 2016, supra note 20, at 30. 
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finance concepts among Hispanics.”83 Thus, Hispanics answered 40% of 
the literacy questions correctly, as compared to 49% for the general 
population.84 Moreover, 30% of Hispanics answered more than half of 
the questions correctly, as compared to 48% of the general population.85 
Empirical evidence also highlights gender differences in financial 
literacy rates. Thus, the Index survey revealed that men answered an 
average of 51% of questions correctly, while women answered an 
average of 48% of questions correctly.86 Moreover, 20% of men answ- 
ered more than 75% of the questions correctly, while only 13% of 
women did so.87 Similarly, the 2015 NFC Study revealed that on aver- 
age, women answered 2.9 questions correctly while men answered 3.5 
questions correctly.88 To be sure, since the baseline for financial literacy 
was four correctly answered questions, neither group earned a passing 
grade.89 However, the survey confirmed the considerable differences in 
overall literacy levels between men and women documented by prior 
studies.90 
Studies also indicate that Americans lack understanding of key 
investment considerations. Thus, the 2016 Index survey found that on 
average, individuals answered only 46% of financial literacy questions 
related to investing correctly—which also translates into a failing 
grade.91  
Most importantly for purposes of this Article, studies also confirm 
that investors are financially illiterate. Some studies reveal that investors 
perform better on financial literacy tests than noninvestors.92 
 
83 TIAA Institute, GFLEC Report Offers Deeper Understanding of Hispanic Financial 
Literacy (October 11, 2017), https://www.tiaa.org/public/about-tiaa/news-press/press-releas 
es/pressrelease690.html [https://perma.cc/MP64-YQCR]; Andrea Hasler, Annamaria Lusardi 
& Paul J. Yakoboski, Financial Literacy among U.S. Hispanics: New Insights from the 
Personal Finance (P-Fin) Index 2 (October 2, 2017), https://www.tiaainstitute.org/sites/ 
default/files/presentations/2017-10/TIAA%20Institute-GFLEC%20Hispanic%20P-
Fin%20Index%20Report_October%202017.pdf [https://perma.cc/5XAS-ZL52]. 
84 See Hasler et al., supra note 83, at 2. The study also found a significant difference in 
literacy rates between Hispanics born in the United States and foreign-born Hispanics. See 
id. at 3-6. 
85 See id. at 2. 
86 See Lusardi et al., A New Measure, supra note 1, at 7. 
87 See id. at 8. 
88 See Financial Capability in the United States 2016, supra note 20, at 29–30. 
89 See id. at 28.  
90 See id. at 30. 
91 See Lusardi et al., A New Measure, supra note 1, at 5. 
92 See Elan, supra note 1, at 6–15. 
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Nevertheless, investors’ scores generally do not amount to a passing 
grade, and instead reveal that investors, like noninvestors, do not 
sufficiently understand basic financial concepts or how best to effec- 
tively apply them.93 For example, studies reveal that while investors 
perform better than average on some basic financial concepts related to 
long-term returns, they did not get a passing grade on concepts related to 
interest and diversification.94 The Library of Congress survey of the 
financial literacy studies related to investors noted that such studies 
“conclude overwhelmingly that American investors lack essential know- 
ledge of the most rudimentary financial concepts . . . Consequently, it is 
not surprising that investors do not understand advanced financial 
concepts . . . .”95 
Collectively, these studies find that Americans are not financially 
literate. This finding has been consistent throughout the years in which 
Americans have been surveyed. Hence, from the 1990s to 2017, studies 
highlight a consistent pattern of financial illiteracy in the American 
population. While some studies document small changes from year to 
year, those changes do not reflect an appreciable increase in the financial 
literacy rates of Americans. Instead, the only clear conclusion that can 
be drawn from this decades-plus body of research related to financial 
literacy is that, on average, Americans are not financially literate. 
C. Literacy Matters 
Financial literacy has an impact on both short-term and long-term 
individual wellbeing.96 Individuals must make a variety of financial 
decisions throughout their lives, including consuming, saving, investing, 
borrowing, and insuring.97 These financial decisions not only have 
important repercussions, but also are inextricably linked to financial 
literacy.98 Studies indicate that people who are financially literate are 
more likely to engage in a range of financially responsible behaviors that 
increase their financial stability and security, while decreasing their 
 
93 See id. at 5–6. 
94 See id. at 11 (citing study of adult investors). 
95 Id. at 25. 
96 See Letter from David M. Walker, in GAO Forum, supra note 4, at 1 (noting that a lack 
of financial literacy affects individuals’ economic well-being and security). 
97 See Lusardi et al., A New Measure, supra note 1, at 2. 
98 See Lusardi, Financial Literacy, supra note 1, at 2.  
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likelihood of encountering financial instability and distress.99 For 
example, financially literate individuals are more likely to be able to 
manage their current financial obligations, such as balancing monthly 
income and expenses.100 They are more likely to successfully manage 
debt in ways that avoid financial hardship and upheaval.101 Financially 
literate individuals are more likely to plan for the future and save for 
anticipated and unanticipated financial events.102 Viewed together, 
research clearly demonstrates that individuals with greater financial 
knowledge are more likely to experience positive financial outcomes in 
a variety of contexts.103 In contrast, financial illiteracy can lead to poor 
money management and decision making, which can lower an 
individual’s standard of living and undermine her ability to achieve 
crucial long-term goals such as buying a home and saving for 
retirement.104 
Financial literacy also has a significant impact on an individual’s 
future economic health. Financial literacy enhances the likelihood that 
someone will contribute to her retirement savings, which has significant 
short- and long-term implications.105 Indeed, people who are financially 
literate are not only more likely to contribute to their retirement savings, 
but are also more likely to contribute at an early age, to contribute more 
money, and to avoid early withdrawals from their retirement account.106 
All of these behaviors increase the likelihood that an individual will 
retire with appropriate savings. By contrast, low levels of financial 
literacy often translate into difficulty accumulating retirement savings.107 
As one survey concluded, “‘[l]ow levels of investor literacy have serious 
implications for the ability of broad segments of the population to retire 
comfortably.”108  
 
99 See Angrisani et al., supra note 1, at 18; Financial Capability in the United States 2016, 
supra note 20, at 19; Hasler et al., supra note 83, at 13 (noting that financial literacy 
positively correlates with better financial outcomes); Chiara Monticone, How Much Does 
Wealth Matter in the Acquisition of Financial Literacy?, 44 J. Con. Aff. 403, 404 (2010).  
100 See Angrisani et al., supra note 1, at 15. 
101 See id. at 18. 
102 See id.  
103 See Lusardi et al., A New Measure, supra note 1, at 16–17. 
104 See Letter from David M. Walker, in GAO Forum, supra note 4, at 1. 
105 See Behrman et al., Household Wealth Accumulation, supra note 32, at 303. 
106 See Financial Capability in the United States 2016, supra note 20, at 15; Lusardi, 
Financial Literacy, supra note 1, at 13–14; Lusardi & Mitchell, supra note 42, at 39. 
107 See Elan, supra note 1, at 26. 
108 See id. 
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In addition, financial literacy has both micro- and macro-economic 
implications because our economy is interconnected and, as a result, 
individual behaviors significantly influence the broader economy.109 
Research reveals that households that are more financially literate are 
more likely to build wealth for themselves and future generations.110 
Because financially literate households are more likely to save, they are 
more likely to have resources to pass on to the next generation. In this 
regard, financial literacy is one key determinant of the wealth gap in 
America because it correlates positively to wealth building, 
distinguishing between those who do and those who do not build 
wealth.111 As a corollary, this suggests that financial literacy has the 
possibility to better ensure that the next generation does not lack the 
resources to become more economically mobile, thus increasing the 
likelihood that they will be better positioned to take advantage of 
opportunities associated with mobility.112 The financial crisis of 2008 
was a clear example of the fact that individual financial decisions can 
impact the economy as a whole.113 In this regard, financial literacy has 
critical implications for individuals and the economy.  
II. SECURITIES LAW IMPLICATIONS I: LITERACY MATTERS IN THE 
SECURITIES MARKET 
Part II of this Article not only identifies why low levels of financial 
literacy matter for the securities market, but also why securities 
regulators may have underestimated the scope of the financial literacy 
problem. 
 
109 See Macey, supra note 10, at 329. 
110 See Behrman et al., Household Wealth Accumulation, supra note 32, at 303. 
111 See id.; Annamaria Lusardi & Olivia S. Mitchell, The Economic Importance of 
Financial Literacy: Theory and Evidence, 52 J. Econ. Literature 5, 22 (2014) (noting that the 
more financially savvy are more likely to undertake retirement planning, and those who plan 
for retirement are able to accumulate more wealth than those who don’t); Annamaria 
Lusardi, Pierre-Carl Michaud & Olivia S. Mitchell, Optimal Financial Knowledge and 
Wealth Inequality 3–4 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 18669, 2013), 
http://www.nber.org/papers/w18669.pdf [https://perma.cc/GT3J-3KK9] (showing the 
financial knowledge accounts for large portions of wealth inequality). 
112 See Andrea Newell, Closing the Wealth Gap Through Financial Literacy, Fostering 
Diversity & Purpose at Work (April 6, 2016), https://www.triplepundit.com/special/ 
fostering-diversity-and-purpose-at-work/closing-wealth-gap-financial-literacy/ 
[https://perma.cc/NDP5-6FAS]; Angrisani, et al., supra note 1, at 18. 
113 See Lusardi, et al., A New Measure, supra note 1, at 2, 20. 
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A. Literacy Matters in the Market 
1. The Market, Suitable Investment Choices, and Literacy 
Our securities regime is premised on disclosure, and by extension, is 
premised on the ability of investors to understand the information being 
disclosed. In passing the Securities Act of 1933 and the Securities 
Exchange Act of 1934, founders of the federal securities regime 
explicitly rejected other normative framings in favor of disclosure.114 As 
Professor Thomas Hazen explains, “It is a basic tenet of federal 
securities regulation that investors’ ability to make their own evaluations 
of available investments obviates any need that some observers may 
perceive for the more costly and time-consuming governmental merit 
analysis of the securities being offered.”115 In rejecting a merit-based 
system, founders embraced a belief that the best way to protect investors 
was to provide them with adequate disclosure so that they could make 
their own decisions about suitable investments:116 “The theory behind 
the federal regulatory framework is that investors are adequately 
protected if all relevant aspects of the securities being marketed are fully 
and fairly disclosed. The reasoning is that full disclosure provides 
investors with sufficient opportunity to evaluate the merits of an 
investment and fend for themselves.”117 The presumption surrounding 
the benefits of disclosure is so strong that there is often detailed 
 
114 See Felix Frankfurter, The Federal Securities Act: II, Fortune, Aug. 1933, at 53–54. In 
his message to Congress when signing the Securities Act of 1933 into law, President 
Franklin Roosevelt stated the government’s actions should not be construed as approving the 
soundness or value of securities, but insisted that the government had an obligation to insist 
that securities sold be “accompanied by full publicity and information.” President Franklin 
D. Roosevelt, Message to Congress (March 29, 1933), quoted in S. Rep. No. 73-85; see also 
Hazen, supra note 7, § 1.17; Federal Securities Act: Hearing on H.R. 4314 Before the H. 
Comm. on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 73d Cong. 53–55, 143–44 (1933). 
115 Hazen, supra note 7, § 1.17. 
116 See id.; Steven M. Davidoff & Claire A. Hill, Limits of Disclosure, 36 Seattle U. L. 
Rev. 599, 605 (2013) (“Disclosure is the sine qua non of the federal securities law.”); 
Kenneth B. Firtel, Plain English: A Reappraisal of the Intended Audience of Disclosure 
Under the Securities Act of 1933, 72 S. Cal. L. Rev. 851, 858 (1999) (“Congress intended 
disclosure to enable the average investor to make an informed investment decision.”); see 
also Brown, supra note 8, § 2.01[A] (“[t]he main focus of the securities laws has always 
been disclosure” with “investment decisions left in the hands of investors”); id. § 4.01 
(noting that disclosure was aimed at providing investors with “an intelligent basis for 
forming [a] judgment as to the value of” securities).  
117 Hazen, supra note 7, § 1.17.   
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disclosure even in offerings that are not subject to mandatory-disclosure 
rules.118 
The belief that disclosure represents the best form of protecting 
investors is challenged if investors are not financially literate. As 
regulators have acknowledged, a basic knowledge of financial concepts 
and the ability to apply those concepts is crucial for ensuring that 
investors can act autonomously, without the aid of regulators.119 
However, studies reveal that Americans routinely score very low on 
financial literacy questions related to investing, including deciding 
among investment choices.120 The literacy problem is underscored when 
viewed in the context of federal securities law disclosure. This is 
because the concepts being disclosed and the decisions being implicated 
by disclosure are far from simple. Hence, the fact that Americans have 
difficulty understanding basic financial terms and concepts means that 
the problem is even more acute for those American investors tasked with 
understanding more complex financial terms and concepts.121  
Further evidence that the premises around disclosure may be flawed 
stems from literacy data related to risks. On the one hand, research 
reveals that understanding about risk and risk assessment impacts an 
individual’s ability to make well-informed investment choices.122 On the 
other hand, studies consistently reveal that most individuals have a 
subpar understanding of risk.123 Overall, financial literacy surrounding 
risk is the lowest of all financial concepts, with most Americans 
incorrectly answering questions related to risk and risk assessment.124 
The 2015 NFC Study revealed that Americans could answer only 46% 
of risk-related questions correctly.125 In another recent study, individuals 
 
118 See Davidoff & Hill, supra note 116, at 608. 
119 See OECD Survey, supra note 1, at 19. 
120 See Hasler et al., supra note 83, at 12; Lusardi et al., A New Measure, supra note 1, at 
5.  
121 See Elan, supra note 1, at 25–26. Lusardi maintains that knowledge beyond basic 
financial concepts is critical for ensuring that individuals can competently make saving and 
investment decisions. Such knowledge requires asking additional questions related to bonds, 
stocks, mutual funds, and basic asset pricing. See Lusardi, Financial Literacy, supra note 1, 
at 7–9. Lusardi found that advanced knowledge is not widespread, even among highly 
educated individuals. Id. at 10. 
122 See Lusardi et al., A New Measure, supra note 1, at 5. 
123 See id. (showing that individual financial knowledge is lowest in the areas of risk). 
124 See Hasler et al., supra note 83, at 12. 
 125 Financial Capability in the United States 2016, supra note 20, at 28. 
COPYRIGHT © 2018 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION 
1088 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 104:1065 
answered only 39% of risk-related questions correctly.126 This response 
rate was below the 49% average of overall correct answers.127 This study 
was therefore consistent with previous research revealing that 
individuals experience particular difficulty grasping risk-related 
concepts.128 The study concluded that the finding was “particularly 
troubling given that risk and uncertainty are common features of 
financial decision making.”129 In other words, investors do not appear to 
have the financial capacity they need to make many of the risk-related 
choices they are called upon to make. Because our securities markets 
depend on investors being able to make these choices, their inability to 
make them poses a challenge to the markets. 
In addition, our securities markets rely upon investors being able to 
choose among investment products. However, a basic knowledge of 
financial concepts, and the ability to apply those concepts in a financial 
context, is crucial for ensuring that investors can compare financial 
products and make well-informed decisions about those products.130 
Importantly, investors have an increasingly wide and complex array of 
investment options available to them.131 A lack of literacy can make 
choosing among those options difficult, and the empirical evidence 
supports the fact that investors are experiencing significant difficulties in 
this area. Moreover, investors are gaining increased responsibility for 
making their own investment decisions.132 Historically employers 
offered pensions or defined-benefit plans pursuant to which employees 
did not have to select among an array of investment options.133 But such 
plans have become rare, shifting the responsibility for investment 
 
126 See Lusardi et al., A New Measure, supra note 1, at 5. 
127 See id. 
128 See id. at 5–6. The study explains that “[c]omprehending risk involves understanding 
that the expected financial outcome in a given scenario depends on the range of possible 
outcomes in the scenario, the financial implication associated with each outcome, and the 
likelihood of each outcome occurring.” Id. at 6. 
129 Id. at 5. 
130 See OECD Survey, supra note 1, at 19. 
131 See Letter from David M. Walker, in GAO Forum, supra note 4, at 2; Angrisani et al., 
supra note 1, at 25 (noting the fact that investors must understand and choose from among a 
variety of complex financial products); Lusardi et al., A New Measure, supra note 1, at 19. 
132 See Letter from David M. Walker, in GAO Forum, supra note 4, at 2. 
133 See Angrisani et al., supra note 1, at 18 (noting that there has been a progressive shift 
towards employer-related retirement plans that place more of the decision making in the 
hands of investors). 
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selection into the hands of employees.134 The empirical evidence 
unequivocally confirms that Americans experience particular difficulty 
around making investment choices, and selecting among financial 
products and investment types.135 This does not bode well for a system 
that increasingly depends upon investors being able to make such 
choices in an appropriate manner. 
2. Market Discipline, Efficiency, and Literacy 
The securities markets also depend, at least to some extent, upon 
investors to discipline the market by “choosing appropriate financial 
investments, products, and services.”136 Because the market may depend 
on investors for such discipline, if investors are not financially 
sophisticated, that discipline will be eroded. The evidence surrounding 
the ability (or more appropriately, the inability) of investors to 
effectively choose among investment products and services highlights 
the literacy concerns associated with the expectation that investors can 
be a source of market discipline and thus efficiency. Importantly, this 
discipline is tied to price efficiency.137 There is debate about the extent 
to which disclosure enhances price efficiency.138 However, as one 
scholar notes, the federal securities laws “reflect the deeply imbedded 
assumption that timely, full, and complete corporate disclosure” will 
achieve accurate and efficient pricing of securities.139 Financial illiteracy 
means that investors are ill-equipped for this task, increasing the 
likelihood that our markets will be inefficient. 
 
134 See id.  
135 See id. at 22–25. 
136 Letter from David M. Walker, in GAO Forum, supra note 4, at 1; see also Brown, supra 
note 8, § 4.01 (noting connection between disclosure and efficient pricing in the market); 
Hazen, supra note 7, § 1:16 (stating that “[t]he focus on disclosure was based on the 
conclusion that sunlight is the best disinfectant”); Dennis, supra note 10, at 414 (discussing 
the positive role that analysts play in maintaining an efficient market); Macey, supra note 10, 
at 329 (arguing that “[t]he ‘demand-side’ of the market must also function” in order to create 
accurate and efficient pricing of securities).   
137 See Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical 
Work, 25 J. Fin. 383, 383, 387–88 (1970); Ronald J. Gilson & Reinier H. Kraakman, The 
Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 Va. L. Rev. 549, 637–38 (1984); Jeffrey N. Gordon & 
Lewis A. Kornhauser, Efficient Markets, Costly Information, and Securities Research, 60 
N.Y.U. L. Rev. 761, 811–12 (1985). 
138 See Allen Ferrell, Measuring the Effects of Mandated Disclosure, 1 Berkeley Bus. L.J. 
369 (2004) (highlighting the flaws in the empirical evidence on the connection between 
disclosure and price accuracy).  
139 Macey, supra note 10, at 329.  
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3. Fraud and Literacy 
Our markets depend on investor literacy to help detect and prevent 
fraud.140 Of course, our securities regime includes numerous antifraud 
mechanisms aimed at deterring, detecting, and holding individuals 
accountable for securities and investment fraud. Still, our markets also 
rely on investors to play a role in this endeavor.141 Indeed, in passing the 
federal securities laws, Congress intended disclosure to serve as a form 
of investor protection from fraudulent securities practices.142 Financial 
illiteracy seems to negate the appropriateness of such reliance. Some 
have suggested that investors’ inability to understand financial concepts 
and compare among appropriate investment choices increases the 
likelihood that fraud will occur.143 Moreover, financial illiteracy coupled 
with over-confidence in financial knowledge (that is, getting literacy 
questions wrong while thinking they are correct) increases the likelihood 
of financial fraud and thus also decreases the likelihood that we can 
depend on investors to protect against fraud.144 In addition, 
technological advances have made it easier to target investors, 
increasing their vulnerability to fraudsters seeking to lure them with 
inappropriate financial products and investment opportunities.145 
Bolstering financial literacy may help combat this vulnerability.146 
 
140 See Angrisani et al., supra note 1, at 25. 
141 See id. 
142 See Firtel, supra note 116, at 856–57. 
143 See Annamaria Lusardi, Financial Literacy and Financial Decision-Making in Older 
Adults, Generations: J. Am. Soc’y on Aging (July 3, 2012), http://www.asaging.org 
/blog/financial-literacy-and-financial-decision-making-older-adults [https://perma.cc/639Z-
DRNM] (discussion correlation between financial literacy and behaviors that make 
individuals more susceptible to fraud); S. Duke Han, Financial Literacy: A Way to Address 
the Problem of Financial Exploitation?, sifma Blog (Feb. 28, 2017), https://www.sifma.org/  
resources/news/financial-literacy-a-way-to-address-the-problem-of-financial-exploitation/ 
[https://perma.cc/JL4D-Z9UN] (suggesting that financial literacy can be used to combat 
financial fraud because greater financial literacy is associated with better financial decision 
making). But see NASD Investor Education Foundation, Investor Fraud Study Final Report 
5 (May 12, 2006), https://www.sec.gov/news/press/extra/seniors/nasd fraudstudy051206.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4AQ6-FGQ3] (revealing that investment fraud victims have a better 
understanding of basic financial literacy than nonvictims). 
 144 See Keith Jacks Gamble et al., Aging, Financial Literacy, and Fraud 4–5 (Network for 
Studies on Pensions, Aging and Retirement, Discussion Paper No. 11/2013-066).  
145 See Letter from David M. Walker, in GAO Forum, supra note 4, at 2. 
146 By contrast, one survey found that fraud victims score higher than nonvictims on 
financial literacy quiz—indicating that even knowledgeable victims are susceptible to fraud. 
The survey suggests that improving financial literacy rates may not have an impact on 
preventing fraud. See NASD Investor Education Foundation, supra note 143. 
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This Section argued that financial illiteracy poses challenges for our 
disclosure-based securities system, because illiteracy seems to negate 
presumptions that are important for the healthy functioning of that 
system. The following sections respond to critiques of this argument, 
and not only demonstrate the flaws associated with such critiques, but 
also that that those critiques have caused us to underestimate the scope 
and extent of the challenges posed by financial illiteracy. This 
underestimation stems in large part from three problematic notions: (1) 
disclosure is not really important to our securities regime, (2) the 
financial literacy problem is limited to a small (and potentially 
insignificant) segment of the investor population, and (3) investor 
education can serve as the almost exclusive anecdote to our financial 
literacy concerns. 
B. Disclosure Has No Clothes? 
One reason for minimizing the importance of the literacy problem in 
the context of securities regulation may be that many have questioned 
the effectiveness, and hence importance, of disclosure to federal 
securities regulation. In other words, if disclosure is not particularly 
effective, then the financial literacy problem, or the failure to understand 
that disclosure, is not particularly concerning. 
The effectiveness of disclosure has been questioned in several ways. 
For example, some insist that the information being disclosed in the 
market is simply too voluminous to be effectively digested.147 These 
critics argue that information overload undermines the efficacy of 
disclosure.148 Others contend that information being disclosed to the 
market is too complex to be understood by most.149 As one set of experts 
 
147 See Roberta S. Karmel, Disclosure Reform—The SEC is Riding Off in Two Directions 
at Once, 71 Bus. Law. 781, 822–23 (2016) (describing reforms focused on information 
overload); see also Troy A. Paredes, Blinded by the Light: Information Overload and Its 
Consequences for Securities Regulation, 81 Wash. U. L.Q. 417, 441–43 (2003); see also 
Jeffrey N. Gordon, The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950–2005: Of 
Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices, 59 Stan. L. Rev. 1465, 1547 (2007) (detailing 
significant growth in length of disclosure documents).  
148 See Omri Ben-Shahar & Carl E. Schneider, The Failure of Mandated Disclosure, 159 
U. Pa. L. Rev. 647, 687–88 (2011) (noting that information overload creates problems with 
assimilating, organizing, and analyzing information). 
149 See Firtel, supra note 116, at 851, 864 (noting critique that disclosure is too 
complicated to be used effectively and that average investor cannot master complexities of 
disclosed information); Erik F. Gerding, Disclosure 2.0: Can Technology Solve Overload, 
Complexity, and Other Information Failures?, 90 Tul. L. Rev. 1143, 1152 (2016); Henry T. 
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notes, “complexity cannot be explained simply.”150 Still others contend 
that investors, even the most sophisticated, too often simply either 
ignore disclosure or use suboptimal shortcuts to digest disclosed 
information.151  
A growing body of social psychology and behavioral economics 
literature confirms that even when people understand disclosed 
information they will often distort, ignore, or misuse that information 
when making decisions.152 Such literature therefore supports the 
possibility that even investors who we believe to be sophisticated 
because they understand disclosed information may have problems 
analyzing information and applying that information when making 
decisions.153 Empirical evidence showing a significant lack of retail 
participation in voting and other investment decisions underscores 
investors’ failure to effectively use available disclosures.154 This fact is 
further illustrated by evidence of investors’ failure to take advantage of 
investor education programs when they are offered to them,155 and the 
large number of investors who default into investment products rather 
than commit the time and resources to engage with information being 
disclosed to them.156 In these ways, critics question the legitimacy of 
disclosure as an effective tool for regulating our securities regime. If it is 
not a critical component of our securities regime, then literacy may not 
be a such a concern.  
However, the regulatory response to criticism regarding the 
effectiveness of disclosure runs counter to this narrative. The regulatory 
 
C. Hu, Too Complex to Depict? Innovation, “Pure Information,” and the SEC Disclosure 
Paradigm, 90 Tex. L. Rev. 1601, 1602 (2012); Steven L. Schwarcz, Rethinking the 
Disclosure Paradigm in a World of Complexity, 2004 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1, 4–6.  
150 Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 148, at 713 (explaining the difficulty with 
presenting complex information in an understandable manner). 
151 See id. at 665, 721; Paredes, supra note 147, at 484. 
152 See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 148, at 720.  
 153 See id. 
154 See Jill E. Fisch, Standing Voting Instructions: Empowering the Excluded Retail 
Investor, 102 Minn. L. Rev. 11, 12 (2017). 
 155 Financial Capability in the United States 2016, supra note 20, at 32 (revealing that 
31% of respondents were offered financial education programs at their school, college, or 
workplace, and 21% of them participated). 
156 See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 148, at 710 (“Even when people know they 
need information, they may not want it enough to labor to acquire it.”); Willis, supra note 29, 
at 245–246. 
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response has been to shore up, rather than abandon, disclosure.157 With 
respect to the issue of information overload, regulators have advanced 
several reform efforts aimed at streamlining and reducing disclosure.158 
With regard to complexity, some regulators agree that disclosure may 
not be completely effective due to the complicated nature of the 
information disclosed, and thus mechanisms beyond disclosure, such as 
enhanced oversight, may be necessary.159 Other regulators have made 
efforts to use disclosure to reduce complexity.160 In fact, some have 
insisted that complexity may be the result of opaque or limited 
disclosure, thereby suggesting that, rather than render disclosure 
ineffective, disclosure may be one way to combat complexity.161 Finally, 
in the area of investor apathy towards disclosure, regulators have made 
significant attempts to enhance investor participation and thus counteract 
that apathy.162 In so doing, regulators appear to reaffirm the importance 
of disclosure. The regulatory response, in other words, has been to 
double down on disclosure rather than abandon it. To be sure, it is not 
clear if such a response will ameliorate concerns about disclosure’s 
effectiveness. However, that response does make clear that the 
commitment to disclosure continues.163 As a result, the concerns about 
financial literacy remain.  
Importantly, even critics of disclosure’s effectiveness do not suggest 
that we completely eradicate our reliance on disclosure. Instead, those 
critics, like regulators, primarily have encouraged a reassessment of 
disclosure whereby mechanisms are put in place to better support 
disclosure or ensure that disclosure is used in a more targeted or tailored 
fashion.164 The fact that even the most ardent critics of disclosure’s 
 
157 See Davidoff & Hill, supra note 116, at 600 (noting that the prescriptions for defects in 
disclosure is generally more disclosure); Firtel, supra note 116, at 851 (noting that the SEC 
has responded to disclosure concerns with “consistent efforts to make disclosure documents 
more readable and understandable”); Karmel, supra note 147, at 788 (noting SEC’s steady 
focus on improving disclosure despite criticisms of its effectiveness).  
158 See Karmel, supra note 147, at 823–25 (analyzing SEC efforts to modernize and 
simplify disclosures). 
159 See Gerding, supra note 149, at 1152. 
160 See Karmel, supra note 147, at 823–25. 
161 See Gerding, supra note 149, at 1158.  
162 See Fisch, supra note 154, at 30–39. 
163 See Davidoff & Hill, supra note 116, at 607. 
164 See id. at 603–04; Paredes, supra note 147, at 484.  
COPYRIGHT © 2018 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION 
1094 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 104:1065 
effectiveness shy away from advocating an abandonment of disclosure 
underscores its significance to our system of federal regulation.165  
C. An Investor By Any Other Name . . . 
While regulators appreciate the importance of disclosure, they 
nevertheless appear to underestimate the scope of the financial literacy 
problem, because they too often frame the problem in a way that appears 
to relate only to retail investors—i.e., individuals who invest directly in 
the market. Framing the problem as one involving primarily retail 
investors has two implications that serve to minimize financial literacy 
concerns. First, such a framing suggests that the financial literacy 
problem is limited to a relatively small percentage of the investor 
population, as retail investors are both a small and shrinking segment of 
that population. Second, such a framing suggests that any financial 
literacy concerns may be relatively unimportant because disclosures are 
arguably not intended for retail investors.166  
On the surface, these suggestions have significant merit. First, the fact 
that retail investors only represent a small segment of the securities 
market creates the impression that the problem of financial literacy is 
limited to a relatively small pool of investors. As previously noted, when 
an individual invests directly into the securities market, she is referred to 
as a retail investor.167 Individuals also can invest in the market indirectly 
through institutions such as mutual funds, pension funds, insurance 
companies, and hedge funds. When an individual invests indirectly in 
the market, the institution (as opposed to the individual) is the investor. 
This means that the primary investment decision made by such an 
individual is the initial decision to invest in a particular institution. 
Historically retail investors dominated the securities market, owning 
about 90% of the federal securities market in 1950.168 Today, the 
securities market is dominated by institutional investors, with retail 
 
165 See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 148, at 745 (acknowledging that skepticism of 
mandated disclosure does not mean that it can never work). 
166 See Davidoff & Hill, supra note 116, at 600 (explaining that retail investors might not 
be expected to read or understand disclosures); Firtel, supra note 116, at 864; see also 
Davidoff & Hill, supra note 116, at 628 (stating that regulators are “not conceptually 
troubled by the existence of some retail investors who might be a bit naïve or credulous”).  
167 See Lisa M. Fairfax, Shareholder Democracy: A Primer on Shareholder Activism and 
Participation 45 (2011). 
168 See id. at 45–46. 
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investors playing an increasingly small role in the markets, holding at 
most about 37% of the securities market.169 The dominance of 
institutional shareholders appears to make the financial literacy problem 
less acute, because our federal securities laws presume that such 
institutions are financially literate, and thus sophisticated enough to 
make appropriate investment decisions.170 By comparison, the relatively 
small percentage of retail investors suggests that the financial literacy 
problem impacts a relatively small segment of the overall securities 
market.  
Second, if disclosure is not intended for the retail investor, their 
literacy or lack thereof should not be concerning. There is considerable 
debate regarding the intended audience of disclosure.171 Many contend 
that disclosure is not intended for the retail investor.172 Instead, 
disclosure is aimed at institutions and other sophisticated investors.173 
Disclosure is also directed at financial intermediaries. Financial 
intermediaries are financial professionals (both individuals and 
institutions), such as securities brokers and even lawyers, who help 
facilitate financial transactions.174 They are presumed to have a high 
 
169 See id. at 46; see also Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., Federal Reserve 
Statistical Release Z.1, Financial Accounts of the United States: Flow of Funds, Balance 
Sheets, and Integrated Macroeconomic Accounts, Fourth Quarter 2015 (Mar. 10, 2016), at 
126 tbl.L.223 l.11. Studies also show that the vast majority of individual participants in the 
market are the richest people in America, and that the top 10% of American households, 
defined by total wealth, hold the vast majority of securities. See Jared Bernstein, Yes, Stocks 
are Up. But 80 Percent of the Value is Held by the Richest 10 Percent, Wash. Post (March 2, 
2017), https://www.washingtonpost.com/posteverything/wp/2017/03/02/perspective-on-the-
stock-market-rally-80-of-stock-value-held-by-top-10/; Rob Wile, The Richest 10% of 
Americans Now Own 84% of All Stocks, Time (Dec. 19, 2017), http://time.com/money/ 
5054009/stock-ownership-10-percent-richest/ [https://perma.cc/565Z-HA7G]. 
170 See Cary Martin, Private Investment Companies in the Wake of the Financial Crisis: 
Rethinking the Effectiveness of the Sophisticated Investor Exemption, 37 Del. J. of Corp. L. 
49, 67–68 (2012) (discussing the history of Regulation D, the concept of accredited investor, 
and the fact that the SEC used the accredited investor standard as a presumption that various 
institutions should be deemed financially sophisticated). 
171 See Firtel, supra note 116, at 851. 
172 See Davidoff & Hill, supra note 116, at 600 (stating that retail investors might not 
expected to read or understand disclosures); Firtel, supra note 116, at 864.  
173 See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 148, at 732 (finding that securities disclosures 
are aimed at sophisticated participants); Davidoff & Hill, supra note 116, at 600 (“Securities 
laws rely on the assumption that sophisticated investors read and understand securities 
disclosures.”); Firtel, supra note 116, at 864.  
174 See generally William O. Fisher, Does the Efficient Market Theory Help Us Do Justice 
in a Time of Madness?, 54 Emory L.J. 843, 854–55 (2005) (noting the importance of market 
professionals to market efficiency and appropriate price signaling); Kenneth Rosen, 
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level of financial sophistication.175 And even though they are not 
necessarily investors, such intermediaries collect and analyze 
information and then disseminate it to the investing public, sending 
signals to retail and other investors about appropriate financial 
decisions.176 In contrast, many people argue that retail investors are not 
intended or expected to understand disclosures; instead they “free ride” 
off of these information signals.177 Their ability to “free ride” appears to 
render their financial literacy a moot issue.178 The dominance of 
institutional investors, coupled with the presence of financial 
intermediaries in the market, may be creating a sense of security that 
financial literacy is not a pressing concern for the securities markets, 
since those markets do not need to depend upon the financial literacy of 
retail investors. 
However, this sense of security is false. The notion that disclosure is 
not intended for the retail investor, and hence we need not worry about 
their ability to understand that disclosure, is both overly simplistic and 
inaccurate. In order to better understand why that is so, this Article will 
advance a typology of the investment community and its disclosure 
needs to highlight the fact that disclosure is important to all investors, 
and that the literacy issue raises concern for the effectiveness of 
disclosure at all levels. Importantly, this Article acknowledges that the 
nature and content of disclosure may differ for distinct types of 
investors. However, this Article insists that such different disclosure 
needs do not undermine the fact that literacy poses a broad concern for 
the securities market. 
 
Financial Intermediaries as Principals and Agents, 48 Wake Forest L. Rev. 625, 628 (2013); 
Robert B. Thompson, Market Makers and Vampire Squid: Regulating Securities Markets 
After the Financial Meltdown, 89 Wash. U. L. Rev. 323, 331–34 (2011) (explaining the role 
intermediaries play in the investing process).  
175 See Rosen, supra note 174, at 628–29. 
176 See Dennis, supra note 10, at 414; Firtel, supra note 116, at 867–69; Kathryn Judge, 
Intermediary Influence, 82 U. Chi. L. Rev. 573, 590–93 (2015); Donald C. Langevoort, 
Information Technology and the Structure of Securities Regulation, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 747, 
779 (1985) (noting the role analysts play in monitoring companies and influence investors to 
purchase or sell securities); Rosen, supra note 174, at 630.  
177 See Gerding, supra note 149, at 1153; Firtel, supra note 116, at 867 (noting that 
intermediaries perform a filtration function).  
178 See Davidoff & Hill, supra note 116, at 628 (noting that because retail investors are not 
expected to understand disclosures, regulators are “not conceptually troubled by the 
existence of some retail investors who might be a bit naïve or credulous”).  
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1. The Individual as Retail Investor 
It is noteworthy that while retail investors occupy a small percentage 
of the market relative to institutions, such investors nevertheless have a 
significant presence in the market. Currently, retail investors hold 
approximately 37% of the corporate equities market.179 This represents a 
large number of individual investors. Further, the percentage of retail 
investors varies from company to company, with some companies 
having over 60% of shares held by retail investors.180 Like institutions 
that invest directly in the market, retail investors regularly receive 
securities law disclosures such as prospectuses, annual reports, quarterly 
reports, and proxy statements, all of which are replete with information 
about a company and its financial position. While the retail investor pool 
may be smaller than the institutional pool, retail investors still represent 
a sizeable share of the market and are being asked to engage with 
traditional disclosure documents that the financial literacy data suggest 
they may not be able to fully understand. The tendency, therefore, to 
minimize the financial literacy problem based solely on the percentage 
of retail investors is misguided. 
Perhaps more importantly, the notion that financial illiteracy does not 
matter because retail investors can “free ride” off of more sophisticated 
investors is problematic. Retail investors’ ability to “free ride” relies on 
several presumptions that are debatable at best. First is the presumption 
that institutions and other so-called sophisticated investors are in fact 
sophisticated.181 As this Article will discuss further in Subsection II.B.3, 
this presumption may be too simplistic. Even if institutional investors 
are sophisticated, we also have to presume that such investors are 
appropriately incentivized to invest the time and resources necessary for 
making suitable investment decisions, thereby signaling that suitability 
to retail investors.182 There is little empirical support for this 
presumption and evidence to refute it. As an initial matter, the historical 
apathy toward shareholder votes within the institutional investment 
community seems to cut against this presumption. The tremendous 
growth in the proportion of institutional investors fostered a belief that 
 
179 See Bd. of Governors of the Fed. Reserve Sys., supra note 169, at 126 tbl.L.223 l.11.  
180 See Fairfax, supra note 167, at 47. 
181 See Gerding, supra note 149, at 1153 (noting that concerns about disclosure are “less 
worrisome because more sophisticated investors can analyze the products and less 
sophisticated investors can free ride off the market price”). 
182 Davidoff & Hill, supra note 116, at 622; Thompson, supra note 174, at 342. 
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such investors would fulfill a much-needed gatekeeping role for retail 
investors and other market participants when it came to voting.183 
Instead, the empirical evidence revealed that institutional investors had 
neither the motivation nor the incentive to perform such a function.184 
Even as institutional investors have become more active in recent years, 
empirical evidence reveals that many institutional investors still rely 
heavily on advisors when making critical voting and investment 
decisions.185 Finally, there is anecdotal evidence suggesting that many 
institutional investors do not perform their signaling function, or at least 
do not perform it in the manner we had expected.186 That evidence 
reveals that many sophisticated investors ignore or minimize critical 
disclosures.187 This Article acknowledges that many institutional 
investors play an important signaling function to the market and other 
investors. However, the problem is that this function may not be 
performed consistently, or may not be performed consistently in the 
manner we have presumed. Even if only some institutional investors fail 
to perform their signaling function some of the time,188 the fact that we 
cannot rely on them to perform on a consistent basis is problematic if the 
primary reason why we are unconcerned about retail investor illiteracy is 
that we have confidence in the reliability of the signaling function 
played by sophisticated investors. 
 
183 See Bernard S. Black, Agents Watching Agents: The Promise of Institutional Investor 
Voice, 39 UCLA L. Rev. 811, 812–813 (1992) (noting that large institutions can overcome 
the incentives of passivity); Bernard S. Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, 89 Mich. 
L. Rev. 520, 523–524 (1990). 
184 See Black, Shareholder Passivity Reexamined, supra note 183, at 584, 608.  
185 See Tamara C. Belinfanti, The Proxy Advisory and Corporate Governance Industry: 
The Case for Increased Oversight and Control, 14 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 384, 394, 398 
(2009); Stephen J. Choi, Jill E. Fisch & Marcel Kahan, Director Elections and the Role of 
Proxy Advisors, 82 S. Cal. L. Rev. 649, 657 (2009); James Woolery, Boards Should 
Minimize the Role of Proxy Advisors, Harv. L. Sch. F. on Corp. Governance & Fin. Reg. 
(Oct. 31, 2013), https://corpgov.law.harvard.edu/2013/10/31/boards-should-minimize-the-
role-of-proxy-advisors/ [https://perma.cc/RE85-XHUN].  
186 See John C. Coffee, Jr. & Hillary A. Sale, Redesigning the SEC: Does Treasury Have a 
Better Idea?, 95 Va. L. Rev. 707, 711–12 (2009); Davidoff & Hill, supra note 116, at 601 n.6 
(noting that some sophisticated investors simply followed their peers and the herd without 
paying adequate attention to disclosures). 
187 See Davidoff & Hill, supra note 116, at 608–26 (describing examples of sophisticated 
investors failing to heed warnings contained in disclosures). 
188 See id. at 601 n.6 (noting that many institutional investors read and understood 
disclosure, but many others did not). 
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The notion that retail investors can rely on other investors also 
appears to be based on the assumption that institutional investors’ 
interests are suitably aligned with the interests of retail investors. This 
too is a contestable proposition. Shareholders are different. Shareholders 
have distinct interests and goals, including varying investment time 
horizons.189 This fact undermines the presumption that the interests and 
goals of investors will always be aligned, and therefore undermines the 
notion that retail investors can predictably rely on institutional investors. 
Available evidence suggests that institutional investors diverge sharply 
from many retail investors on a host of critical issues.190 By contrast, the 
“free rider” claim suggests that retail investors and institutional investors 
would resolve disclosed information in the same manner. 
The presumption that we can rely on financial intermediaries to cure 
the financial literacy concern is also flawed. The flaw stems not only 
from the fact that we may have overestimated the financial 
sophistication of those intermediaries,191 but also from the fact that such 
intermediaries may have conflicts of interests as well as misaligned 
incentives that undermine the extent to which they act in the best 
interests of investors.192 Similar to sophisticated investors, anecdotal 
evidence reveals that intermediaries and market analysts do not perform 
their function in the manner we presumed, often merely repeating 
information instead of evaluating it.193 
Then too, retail investors may not be able to rely upon intermediaries 
or even sophisticated investors to fill the gap in their disclosure needs 
 
189 See Iman Anabtawi & Lynn Stout, Fiduciary Duties for Activist Shareholders, 60 Stan. 
L. Rev. 1255, 1283–92 (2008); Iman Anabtawi, Some Skepticism About Increasing 
Shareholder Power, 53 UCLA L. Rev. 561, 579–93 (2006) [hereinafter Anabtawi, Some 
Skepticism].   
190 See Anabtawi, Some Skepticism, supra note 189, at 579–93; see also Fisch, supra note 
154, at 15; Gretchen Morgenson, Small Investors Support the Boards. But Few of Them 
Vote, N.Y. Times (Oct. 6, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/10/06/business/small-inves 
tors.html. 
191 See sources collected at supra note 151. 
192 Brown, supra note 8, § 15.02 (Role of Analysts); John C. Coffee, Jr., The Political 
Economy of Dodd-Frank: Why Financial Reform Tends to be Frustrated and Systemic Risk 
Perpetuated, 97 Cornell L. Rev. 1019, 1032 (2012); Davidoff & Hill, supra note 116, at 622 
(discussing conflicts and misaligned incentives of intermediaries); Gerding, supra note 149, 
at 1179; Judge, supra note 176, at 595; Thompson, supra note 174, at 342 (pinpointing 
incentives that may distort the function of intermediaries).  
193 See Brown, supra note 8, § 15.02 (Role of Analysts); Davidoff & Hill, supra note 116, 
at 607 n.26 (noting that “people who the securities laws rely on reading and understanding 
the disclosure did not do so”). 
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for the simple reason that retail investors may engage in markets or 
securities transactions that are not closely followed by intermediaries. 
Technology has made it easier for retail investors to invest without 
interacting with financial intermediaries. Moreover, retail investors may 
invest in smaller companies or investment products not on the radar of 
intermediaries. Retail investors may also invest in private placements 
where robust public information is not available, and again where 
financial intermediaries may not be able to play a signaling role. Finally, 
when retail investors find themselves drawn into unsuitable or 
fraudulent schemes, it is often the case that they engage with 
unregulated entities or those who have managed to escape scrutiny from 
intermediaries and gatekeepers. In these cases, retail investors may be at 
their most vulnerable, and hence any literacy concerns may be especially 
worrisome. Yet such cases are situations in which retail investors do not 
have the ability to depend on intermediaries to substitute for their gaps 
in understanding. 
Finally, even if we presume that sophisticated investors and 
intermediaries can appropriately perform their signaling function, there 
is still reason to be concerned about the literacy levels of any investor 
relying on that function. This is because financial literacy experts agree 
that a baseline level of financial literacy is necessary in order to 
appropriately interpret signals from institutions and intermediaries.194 As 
literacy experts have argued, signaling from third parties is most 
effective when those receiving the signals can understand, analyze, and 
determine how best to adapt those signals to their own individual 
circumstances.195 From this perspective, intermediaries and other more 
sophisticated investors may be important sources of support, but their 
effectiveness will be limited so long as investors do not have their own 
capacity to understand investment decisions.196 
Importantly, it is clear that securities regulators—who fully appreciate 
the prevalence and role of intermediaries and other market 
participants—do not believe that such participants obviate the need for 
retail investors to be financially literate. Indeed, regulators have 
remained committed to enhancing investor education among retail 
investors based on their belief that such investors need to have some 
 
194 See Lusardi et al., A New Measure, supra note 1, at 20. 
195 See id. (noting the importance of proactive participation in order for advising to be 
meaningful). 
196 See id. 
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capacity on their own. Regulators also strenuously cling to the belief that 
disclosures can and should be geared to all investors, including retail 
investors, and that retail investors’ financial literacy is central to 
ensuring that we meet the goals of our disclosure-based securities 
regime.197 Taken together, these observations regarding retail investors 
undermine any claims that financial literacy associated with retail 
investors is relatively insignificant or not worthy of serious concern. 
2. The Individual as Indirect Investor 
The fact that individuals invest indirectly in the market through 
institutions exacerbates the issues of financial literacy. Indirect investors 
comprise a significant component of the market. Empirical evidence 
reveals that once we take into account individuals’ indirect holdings (in 
the form of holdings in mutual funds, pension funds and insurance 
policies), individuals’ effective ownership in the market is closer to 
80%.198 
Both the nature of the disclosures that indirect investors receive, and 
the decisions that they are called upon to make, are different from retail 
investors. However, indirect investors are no less important to the 
securities market. To be sure, indirect investors are not required to act 
upon more traditional disclosure documents. However, they make 
investment decisions, and thus we rely upon them to digest disclosures 
related to those decisions. Moreover, there is no serious dispute about 
the fact that we expect indirect investors to have sufficient capacity to 
understand disclosed information and to make critical investment 
decisions.199 Indeed, similar to the manner in which the securities regime 
relies upon disclosure to those who invest in the traditional company, 
our federal securities regime relies upon disclosure provided to the 
indirect investor for purposes of investor protection, market efficiency, 
and fraud detection and prevention in those markets.200 In other words, 
 
197 See Firtel, supra note 116, at 851, 864. 
198 See Sam Ro, Here’s Who Owns the Stock Market, Business Insider (March 13, 2013), 
http://www.businessinsider.com/chart-stock-market-ownership-2013-3 
[https://perma.cc/3RMG-XCPL].  
199 See Angrisani et al., supra note 1, at 18; Lusardi et al., A New Measure, supra note 1, at 
19. 
200 See Angrisani et al., supra note 1, at 25; Lusardi et al., A New Measure, supra note 1, at 
19 (noting that individuals’ ability to navigate decisions related to investment products is 
linked to financial literacy). 
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such disclosure is aimed at ensuring that the indirect investor is able to 
protect herself when making decisions regarding which mutual fund or 
other entity in which to invest, that the indirect investor can 
appropriately choose among investment products so that the market for 
funds and other institutional investment vehicles is efficient, and that the 
indirect investor can help detect and deter fraud. If the indirect investor 
cannot adequately perform these tasks, it poses a problem for the 
securities regime and the market for these products. 
Importantly, unlike with retail investors, no one disputes that the 
information provided to indirect investors is meant to be digested by 
them, rather than some other market participant. To be sure, indirect 
investors have the ability to, and often do, engage with brokers, dealers, 
and other investment professionals when making their investment 
decisions. However, unlike the retail investors, there is no expectation 
that indirect investors should be able to “free ride.” At best, these market 
professionals serve in an advisory capacity. Consequently, there is no 
serious contention that indirect investors do not need to understand 
information being disclosed to them, either directly or indirectly through 
an intermediary. 
There is also no serious debate about the notion that indirect investors 
struggle to make investment decisions. In fact, studies suggest that these 
investment decisions (how and to what extent to invest in products being 
offered by institutions) pose one of the greatest challenges for 
investors.201 Studies also reveal that indirect investors are increasingly 
being asked to make these decisions without the benefit of advice, which 
further undermines their ability to make sound investment choices.202 
Indirect investors also are being asked to make more decisions, and to 
make more complicated decisions. Moreover, to the extent indirect 
investors receive information orally, experts suggest that oral disclosures 
lead to decreased understanding.203 
While the disclosure problems may be different in the context of 
indirect investors, they are no less acute. Moreover, indirect investors 
account for a sizeable number of investors, and thus pose a widespread 
problem for the securities regime. Indirect investors’ inability to 
effectively make investment decisions not only increases their 
 
201 See Lusardi et al., A New Measure, supra note 1, at 19. 
202 See Angrisani et al., supra note 1, at 18; Lusardi et al., A New Measure, supra note 1, at 
19. 
203 See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 148, at 714.  
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susceptibility to fraud, but also decreases the likelihood that they will 
choose suitable investment products or otherwise ensure a more efficient 
market for the indirect investment community. When viewed through 
the lens of the indirect investors, it is clear that the financial literacy 
problem is severe.  
3. The Institution and “Sophisticated” as Investor 
Our securities regime presumes—and in many respects depends upon 
the presumption—that institutions and some population of investors are 
in fact sophisticated. The presumption is not based on any strenuous 
criteria or empirical evidence. Federal securities law categorizes certain 
institutions and individuals as sophisticated based on financial status or 
the amount of assets an institution manages.204 In other words, 
sophistication does not turn on any effort to test the financial literacy or 
sophistication of any particular individual.205 This fact begs the question 
of how we can be sure that institutions or individuals are in fact 
sophisticated or financially literate.  
In the context of institutions, we know that there are many different 
institutional investors.206 Empirical evidence reveals that these 
institutions have varying financial capacities and capabilities, again 
suggesting that the presumption of institutional investor sophistication is 
debatable.207   
And there are factors that belie the presumption of institutional 
investor sophistication. First, there is significant anecdotal evidence to 
suggest that while some institutions may be deemed sophisticated, many 
others may not.208 Second, experts have highlighted many instances in 
which institutional investors did not make informed investment 
 
204 While the federal securities laws do not define the term “sophisticated,” those laws use 
the term “accredited investor” as a proxy for sophistication. See Martin, supra note 170, at 
67–68. An accredited investor is determined based on status or financial net worth. See id; 
see also 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(1)-(8) (categorizing various institutions as accredited inves- 
tors); 17 C.F.R. § 230.501(a)(5)-(6) (describing accredited investor as applied to a natural 
person as an individual with net worth, or joint net worth with the spouse, at the time of pur- 
chase exceeds $1,000,000, or with individual income exceeding $200,000 or joint income 
exceeding $300,000). 
205 See Martin, supra note 170, at 68. 
206 See id. at 69–75, 77–80 (discussing institutions such as mutual funds, hedge funds, 
endowments and pension plans). 
207 See id.  
208 See Schwarcz, supra note 149, at 13–15 (noting institutional shareholders’ difficulty in 
processing complex information in the structured transactions context). 
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decisions.209 This anecdotal evidence is bolstered by the data discussed 
below related to institutional investor behavior. On the one hand, many 
institutions rely on advisory firms.210 While that reliance stems from 
many factors, evidence suggests that at least one of those factors relates 
to institutional investors’ lack of capacity to fully understand 
disclosures.211 On the other hand, the financial literacy data further 
undermines the presumption of institutional investor sophistication (at 
least as a universal proposition). Importantly, an institution is only as 
sophisticated as the individual or individuals within the institution 
making decisions on behalf of the institution. Consequently, to the 
extent the available evidence suggests that many people we believed to 
be sophisticated are not,212 it also suggests that not all of the institutions 
for which such people have responsibility can be deemed sophisticated.  
Along these same lines, there is reason to believe that our 
presumptions about sophisticated investors may be flawed. Indeed, 
while the available empirical data reveals that some investors are more 
financially literate than others, it also reveals that many investors would 
not get a passing grade on literacy surveys, particularly on issues 
germane to making appropriate investment choices.213 The data also 
suggest that while there are some investors with a high level of financial 
literacy, those investors represent just a fraction of the total 
population—according to one study, at most 16%.214 In this regard, the 
best available data suggest that there is a distinct possibility that at least 
 
209 See Jennifer S. Taub, The Sophisticated Investor and the Global Financial Crisis, in 
Corporate Governance Failures: The Role of Institutional Investors in the Global Financial 
Crisis 188, 188–92 (James P. Hawley et al. eds. 2011); Martin, supra note 170, at 51–53; 
Randolph Thompson, Mortgage Backed Securities, Wall Street, and the Making of a Global 
Financial Crisis, 5 Bus. L. Brief 51, 57 (2008) (noting that institutional investors made 
collectively poor decisions); id. at 54 (appearing to question the suggestion that institutional 
investors had the financial capacity and literacy to understand certain risks); see also 
Davidoff & Hill, supra note 116, at 601 n.6; John E. Girouard, The Sophisticated Investor 
Farce, Forbes (March 24, 2009), https://www.forbes.com/2009/03/24/accredited-investor-
sec-personal-finance-financial-advisor-network-net-worth.html#57508024184b 
[https://perma.cc/U4CZ-E3A7] (noting that the way we define sophistication is a farce). 
210 See Belinfanti, supra note 185, at 385; Choi et al., supra note 185, at 657; Woolery, 
supra note 185, at 1.  
211 See Choi et al., supra note 185, at 655 (noting that institutional investors may rely on 
proxy advisory services because they lack the staff or expertise to research voting issues 
directly).  
 212 See Angrisani et al., supra note 1, at 41–42. 
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214 See Lusardi et al., A New Measure, supra note 1, at 3. 
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some of the institutions and investors we believe to be sophisticated are 
not. 
This possibility is disturbing, given that “The assumption that 
sophisticated investors read and understand disclosure is a critical one 
for the overall capital markets regulatory scheme.”215 The securities 
regime is clearly prepared to accept the possibility that retail investors 
and even indirect investors may not all be financially literate.216 The 
same cannot be said for sophisticated investors,217 as “[o]ur system is 
built on taking seriously that sophisticated investors are, well, 
sophisticated—disclosure directed to them hits its mark.”218 The fact that 
the financial literacy data raise the possibility of financial illiteracy 
within the ranks of the sophisticated and institutional investor is thus 
very concerning. Again, this Article acknowledges that many investors, 
including institutional investors, may in fact be sophisticated. However, 
it also acknowledges that some may not be sophisticated and, perhaps 
more importantly, we do not have adequate mechanisms for 
distinguishing between those who may be sophisticated and those who 
may not. Instead, we presume a universal sophistication, and then rely 
on that presumption to counter concerns about the understandability of 
disclosure. 
4. The Prospective Investor and Literacy Beyond the Securities Market 
Even if all participants in the securities market are financially literate, 
the securities regime must be concerned with financial literacy trends 
outside of the markets. The financial crisis demonstrated that the 
financial and economic decisions people make outside of the market 
influence the securities market and its efficiency and efficacy.219 Thus, 
markets must be concerned with financial literacy rates of noninvestors. 
We also should be concerned broadly that the literacy rates may be 
precluding many people from participating in the securities markets. 
This lack of participation has important financial consequences for the 
 
215 Davidoff & Hill, supra note 116, at 601 n.6. 
216 See id. at 627–28. 
217 See id.  
218 Id.  
219 Rosen, supra note 174, at 631 (quoting Fin. Crisis Inquiry Comm’n, The Financial 
Crisis Inquiry Report: The Final Report of the National Commission on the Causes of the 
Financial and Economic Crisis in the United States xvi (2011) (noting that a collapse in the 
housing market sparked the financial crisis)). 
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individuals who do not participate. Empirical evidence suggests that 
individuals excluded from the market are likely to incur significant costs 
accessing capital, managing debt, and engaging in everyday financial 
transactions.220 In this regard, exclusion from the market translates into 
unfavorable financial conditions for the excluded individuals.221 On a 
micro level, this exclusion is troubling for what it means for people’s 
ability to tap into a more efficient and cheaper form of capital and 
savings. On a macro level, this exclusion has repercussions for the 
securities market. The financial literacy trends could mean that the 
number of consumers of the financial market will decrease over time, 
causing the markets to contract. Healthy and robust markets need 
participants. Financial literacy rates may leave that need unfulfilled. Can 
a securities market thrive in the midst of a society where significant 
segments of the population are not equipped to participate? 
The securities regime should also be concerned with the demographic 
patterns associated with financial literacy. Those patterns reveal that 
financial literary rates are particularly low for women and particular 
ethnic and racial groups.222 As the overall demographic trends change, 
these patterns have serious repercussions for the securities market. 
Indeed, as experts contend, the economic importance of particular racial 
and ethnic groups will grow along with their growth in population.223 
Can we sustain a market that does not include groups that comprise an 
increasingly large portion of the U.S. population? Can we encourage 
such inclusion without addressing the literacy concerns that may be 
hindering inclusion? More broadly, empirical evidence reveals a clear 
income and wealth gap based on race and gender.224 Many contend that 
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the gap is due, at least in part, to lack of participation in the securities 
market, which in turn is due to reduced financial literacy and financial 
capacity among women and certain groups.225 It is not surprising, 
therefore, that available data reveals that whites are by far the most 
dominant participants in the market, both as retail investors and as 
indirect investors.226 A more concerted effort to address the financial 
literacy problem could make the securities regime a critical part of the 
solution to the wealth and income gap, and its related consequences. 
This section contends we may have underestimated the scope of the 
financial literacy problem by shying away from the fact that the problem 
sweeps more broadly than the retail investor. Individual investors’ 
indirect ownership patterns, coupled with the inability of investors to 
rely on institutions and intermediaries and the interconnectedness of our 
economic behaviors, mean that financial literacy has broad implications 
for the securities law regime. 
D. Education and its Limits 
Current reform efforts further underscore the gravity of the financial 
literacy problem, by highlighting both the long-term nature of the 
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problem and the significant difficulties associated with addressing the 
problem. Regulators not only have acknowledged the problem of 
financial literacy, but also have zeroed in on what they believe to be the 
primary means of addressing the problem—investor education.227 As 
early as 2004, the GAO proclaimed that financial illiteracy had broad 
public policy implications, and launched a forum aimed at gathering 
information on how best to address such illiteracy.228 The GAO 
specifically emphasized the importance of a financially literate 
consumer base to our securities markets. “The financial markets work 
best when consumers understand how financial services providers and 
products work and know how to choose among them.”229 Regulators also 
launched a plethora of educational programs and policies aimed at 
addressing the problem. For example, in 2003, Congress passed the Fair 
and Accurate Credit Transactions Act, known as the Financial Literacy 
and Education Improvement Act,230 which created the Financial Literacy 
and Education Commission charged with coordinating federal efforts 
and developing a national strategy for promoting financial literacy.231 As 
of 2003, some twenty different federal agencies had launched thirty 
different programs or initiatives aimed at tackling the problem of 
financial illiteracy.232 Such agencies often partner with private entities or 
local and state governments.233 
Most researchers and financial literacy experts believe that investor 
education is the most important tool for combating financial illiteracy.234 
Consistent with this belief, studies find that education levels are linked 
to financial literacy. For example, one study found that financial 
decision making improves with more education. As a result, those with a 
high school education or less experience more trouble making 
appropriate financial decisions than those with at least a college 
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degree.235 Studies find a clear difference in financial literacy rates based 
on educational levels, with people who have attained higher levels of 
education having greater financial literacy.236 Another study found that 
people with a college degree answered 62% of literacy questions 
correctly, while those with less than a high school degree only answered 
30% of the questions correctly.237 Moreover, participation in financial 
education classes or programs enhances financial literacy. Thus, people 
who have some exposure to financial education answer 55% of literacy 
questions correctly compared with 47% for those with no exposure to 
financial education.238 Then too, individuals who have been exposed to 
financial education are less likely to indicate that they do not know the 
answers to important financial questions.239 With this backdrop in mind, 
researchers contend that investor education is critical to tackling the 
financial literacy problem, and regulators have focused almost all of 
their reform efforts on investor education programs.240 
However, reliance on investor education as a cure for the financial 
literacy problem is rife with challenges. Indeed, the best evidence 
suggests that improving financial literacy requires a change to the K-12 
education system, whereby K-12 students are exposed to financial 
concepts.241 However, transforming the K-12 curriculum to include 
effective financial literacy education is a daunting proposition. It would 
first require consensus around the need to include financial education in 
the K-12 curriculum—a challenge as it could require trade-offs in the 
curriculum that educators and others may be unwilling to make.242 It 
then would require the development of a curriculum tailored to meet the 
needs of students at varying levels of their educational development.243 
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Finally, it would require the political will, resolve, and ability to get 
such a curriculum adopted in all of the educational jurisdictions in the 
United States. Once such a feat is accomplished, it would require 
effective training of educators, as well as appropriate tools to test the 
effectiveness of the curriculum and modify it when necessary.244 At best, 
such a project seems long-term. Even if all of these hurdles were 
overcome, researchers agree that it would take some time before the 
changed K-12 curriculum would translate into significant changes in 
financial literacy levels.245 
Investor education outside of the K-12 system poses its own set of 
challenges. Regulators have developed a host of different educational 
programs aimed at reaching the adult population, ranging from 
informational sessions to delivery of self-study materials and interactive 
games on the Internet.246 Regulators also have emphasized the 
importance of public-private partnerships aimed at targeting different 
investor populations.247 Along these lines, regulators have insisted on the 
importance of using a variety of methods to reach different audiences 
and customizing the information based on those audiences.248 However, 
it has proven very difficult to successfully reach the investor community 
for purposes of investor education. As researchers note, “many federal, 
nonprofit, and financial industry organizations create high-quality 
financial education materials that reach relatively few people.”249  
Importantly, studies reveal that investors do not seek out financial 
advice when they should. There is an inverse relationship with respect to 
seeking financial advice, such that those with the lowest levels of 
financial literacy are the least likely to seek financial advice.250 
However, even for those with high levels of financial knowledge, 
seeking professional advice is the exception rather than the rule.251 Then 
too, studies reveal that people do not seek out or take advantage of 
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investor education programs, even when those programs are easily 
accessible, such as when employers periodically offer such programs to 
their employees.252 
Part of the reason for this behavior may stem from the fact that 
investors overestimate their financial knowledge and their ability to 
make financial decisions.253 The data suggest that there is a difference 
between an individual’s self-perception of their financial literacy and the 
reality, with most Americans giving themselves very high scores with 
respect to their knowledge of financial matters. For example, 60% of 
American adults think they are good with financial matters and at 
math.254 Moreover, 72% of American adults rate themselves above 
average on their financial knowledge.255 While there is some correlation 
between self-perception and the number of correct responses on literacy 
questions, there is a “certain degree of disconnect between perceived 
and actual financial knowledge.”256 This disconnect is concerning, 
because it may suggest that investors may not understand that they are 
not equipped to make appropriate investment choices. This disconnect 
also may explain why many people do not reach out for help when they 
should.257 
Another challenge that investor education confronts is the need for 
such education to be continuous. Appropriate investor education 
requires a baseline exposure and understanding of core financial 
concepts, as well as ongoing education on new products and 
innovations.258 This is particularly true as the financial and investor 
landscape becomes more dynamic and complex, and that landscape 
 
252 See Financial Capability in the United States 2016, supra note 20, at 32 (finding that 
less than a third of respondents reported being offered financial education, 21% of 
respondents were offered and participated, and 10% of respondents were offered and did not 
participate); see also Angrisani et al., supra note 1, at 40.  
253 See Angrisani et al., supra note 1, at 41 (noting that a “large fraction [of Americans] 
know less about financial matters than they think”). 
254 See id. at 34. 
255 See id. (noting that 80% of people who manage their household finances believe they 
have a firm grasp of financial matters, while 53% of those who do not manage the finances 
have such a belief, and that among those who did and did not receive financial education at 
school, 65% and 80%, respectively, believe they had a good level of financial knowledge).  
256 Id. at 35. 
257 See Willis, supra note 29, at 226–53 (emphasizing the prevalence of many different 
biases in financial decision making that undermine the ability of investor education to be 
effective). 
258 See id. at 212–19. 
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becomes inundated with an increasing variety of products and choices.259 
In this environment, it is not only difficult for the investing public to 
keep abreast of changes in market products and services, but it is also 
difficult for regulators to design educational programs that keep abreast 
of those innovations.260 The result is that “financial-literacy education is 
chasing a moving target it will never reach.”261  
Perhaps most telling, the focus on enhancing financial literacy 
through investor education is more than a decade old,262 and yet there 
has been no meaningful change in literacy rates.263 This fact highlights 
the difficulties with combating financial illiteracy through such a 
vehicle. 
As this Part revealed, disclosure is critical to the federal securities law 
system and thus the inability of investors to understand disclosure is 
critical. While some may seek to minimize the financial literacy 
problem, this Part argues that those efforts are based on faulty or 
debatable presumptions. Instead, this Article highlights the significant 
problems financial illiteracy poses to the securities law system and its 
disclosure-based mandate. While this Article does not advocate that we 
abandon that mandate, it does argue that we need to carefully and more 
appropriately consider how best to respond to these problems. Part III 
offers some initial thoughts on the path forward. 
III. SECURITIES LAW IMPLICATIONS II: THE SEARCH FOR SOLUTIONS 
A. Scholarly Attention 
To date, there has been very little scholarly attention paid to the issue 
of financial literacy. My search uncovered a handful of scholarly articles 
directly related to the issue of financial literacy and the securities 
markets, many of which are almost ten years old. We would benefit 
from increased scholarly attention to the issue of financial illiteracy, 
particularly to the extent such attention can expand the discourse on 
viable solutions. 
 
259 See id. 
260 See id. at 218–19. 
261 See id. at 219. 
262 See Letter from David M. Walker, in GAO Forum, supra note 4, at 3.  
 263 See infra Section I.B. 
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B. Education Revisited 
At least one commentator has argued that we should abandon the 
effort at investor education because that effort cannot yield appropriate 
results. In her article, Against Financial-Literacy Education, Professor 
Lauren Willis argues that the “belief in the effectiveness of financial-
literacy education lacks empirical support.”264 Professor Willis then 
documents many methodological flaws and other weaknesses in the 
studies that suggest a positive correlation between investor education 
and enhanced financial literacy.265 Professor Willis also maintains that 
the belief in investor education as an antidote for financial illiteracy is 
“implausible, given the velocity of change in the financial marketplace, 
the gulf between current consumer skills and those needed to understand 
today’s complex nonstandardized financial products, the persistence of 
biases in financial decisionmaking, and the disparity between educators 
and financial-services firms in resources with which to reach 
consumers.”266  
This Article agrees that the investor education solution involves 
challenges, but does not contend that it should be abandoned. Indeed, 
financial literacy experts insist that investor education is the most 
important solution to the financial literacy problem, and that other 
reforms are at best a substitute or support for investor education, 
particularly for a securities regime that will continue to rely on investor 
self-help and literacy. In light of their expertise on this issue, we should 
give some weight to this insistence. Importantly, while there may be 
flaws in the empirical evidence related to the connection between 
investor education and enhanced financial literacy, even Professor Willis 
concedes that the evidence does not indicate that investor education 
cannot be effective under the appropriate circumstances.267 This means 
that there is still reason to support investor education. Finally, this 
Article insists that it is inadvisable to focus only on one solution. 
Investor education should not be the sole focus of our reform efforts. 
But neither should any other measure. Given the nature and extent of the 
 
264 See Willis, supra note 29, at 197. 
265 See id. at 205–10. 
266 See id. at 197. 
267 See id. at 210–11 (noting that the verdict is still out on the effectiveness of financial 
literacy programs). 
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financial literacy problem, it is clear we need a multitude of solutions to 
tackle it. 
However, we do need to refocus investor education efforts beyond the 
K-12 level to change the nature and manner in which such education is 
provided. For example, studies indicate that investor education should 
make efforts to more appropriately take into account individual 
circumstances and better incorporate one-on-one counseling.268 Also, 
investor education must be specifically targeted towards investor 
circumstances, and such education must be customized to address the 
needs of particular groups.269 We also should consider finding ways to 
incentivize investors to obtain investor education, or otherwise mandate 
investor education to better ensure that investors are obtaining education 
when they need it. 
C. Disclosure Revisited 
From one perspective, the financial literacy problem may suggest the 
inadvisability of a regime that is heavily dependent on disclosure and 
hence investor literacy. However, it is not realistic or feasible to 
completely dismantle or abandon our disclosure-based federal securities 
system. Moreover, there are benefits and drawbacks in any securities 
law regime, and hence eschewing disclosure in favor of other models not 
only may not ameliorate financial literacy concerns, but also may create 
unintended consequences. Hence, this Article does not advocate for a 
wholesale rejection of disclosure. 
This Article does insist that we must reevaluate disclosure in light of 
the financial literacy reality. To be sure, many others have 
acknowledged and highlighted the defects and limitations of 
disclosure.270 For example, some have raised concerns about appropriate 
access to information and related concerns of informational asymmetries 
that challenge a disclosure-based regime.271 There also has been 
 
268 See Hasler et al., supra note 83, at 15; Lusardi & Mitchell, supra note 42, at 43; 
Lusardi, Financial Literacy, supra note 1, at 20. 
269 See Elan, supra note 1, at 17. 
270 See Zohar Goshen & Gideon Parchomovsky, The Essential Role of Securities 
 Regulation, 55 Duke L.J. 711, 755 (2006).  
271 See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 148, at 651; Paula J. Dalley, The Use and 
Misuse of Disclosure as a Regulatory System, 34 Fla. St. U. L. Rev. 1089, 1103, 1115 
(2007); Davidoff & Hill, supra note 116, at 603; Susanna Kim Ripken, The Dangers and 
Drawbacks of the Disclosure Antidote: Toward a More Substantive Approach to Securities 
Regulation, 58 Baylor L. Rev. 139, 147–48 (2006). 
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significant discourse around conflicts of interest, regulatory capture, and 
misaligned incentives that undermine effective evaluation of information 
or otherwise impede effective and full dissemination of information by 
investors and financial intermediaries.272 While this discourse around the 
limitations of disclosure is important, it falls short of sufficiently 
grappling with how best to ensure that investors understand information 
once it is disclosed to them. This is because such discourse focuses on 
the problems associated with information flows, bias, and incentives 
rather than how best to increase understanding of basic financial 
concepts. 
Of greater relevance to the financial literacy problem has been the 
discourse about the extent to which investors and intermediaries 
sufficiently understand corporate disclosures. For example, many 
scholarly commentators noted that the financial crisis revealed that 
intermediaries did an “astonishingly poor job” of interpreting 
disclosures.273 By highlighting the fact that many so-called sophisticated 
investors and intermediaries failed to understand information being 
provided to them, the financial crisis also highlighted the financial 
literacy problem and its repercussions.274 Many reforms and proposed 
reforms focused on raising awareness of the financial literacy problem 
and improving financial literacy.275 The ultimate response focuses 
broadly on improving financial literacy among consumers (and thus 
does not have a specific focus on investors and the securities market),276 
and has resulted in important support for financial education 
 
272 See Macey, supra note 10, at 340–41, 349–50 (pinpointing issues of regulatory capture 
and access as well as conflict of interest concerns that undermine the ability of 
intermediaries to process and deliver appropriate information and highlighting the need for a 
system that reflects true objectivity among outside monitors).   
273 See id. at 331. 
274 Gary O. Cohen, Disclosure Developments Affecting Life Insurance Company Products, 
Separate Accounts and Underlying Funds, ST006 ALI-ABA 137, 141–42 (2011); M. Todd 
Henderson, Self-Regulation for the Mortgage Industry, 2013 U. Chi. Legal F. 229, 239–40 
(2013). 
 275 See Jeffrey T. Dinwoodie, Ignorance is Not Bliss: Financial Illiteracy, the Mortgage 
Market Collapse, and the Global Economic Crisis, 18 U. Miami Bus. L. Rev. 181, 203–205 
(2010). 
 276 See Christine Daleiden, Financial Reform for Consumers: An Overview of the Dodd-
Frank Act and the Consumer Protection Bureau, 15-APR Haw. B.J. 4, 5–7 (2011).  
COPYRIGHT © 2018 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION 
1116 Virginia Law Review [Vol. 104:1065 
programs.277 However, our ongoing literacy problem reveals that 
considerably more work must be done in this area.  
The SEC’s “plain English” reform similarly recognized that investors 
were having difficulty understanding disclosures.278 In 1998, the SEC 
adopted the “plain English” rule in an effort to make disclosure more 
understandable, particularly to the ordinary investor.279 For example, the 
rule focuses on removing “legal jargon or highly technical business 
terms” and reducing the length and density of sentences and 
paragraphs.280 However, even that discourse misses the mark because it 
does not delve deep enough into the problem. The issue is not 
demystifying jargon and complex terms, but rather ensuring an 
understanding of basic terms and financial concepts. Therefore, to date, 
there has not been enough significant discourse around the fact that 
investors and at least some of their advisors may not have the capacity to 
process information because they lack basic financial literacy. We must 
engage in this discourse if we want disclosure to truly be effective. 
D. The Focus on Advisors 
The financial literacy problem indicates that we must give significant 
attention to the role and duties of financial advisors. Like disclosure, 
scholarly attention has focused on concerns regarding advisors and 
investor interaction with advisors.281 Such attention has been particularly 
focused on the role of advisors who engage with indirect investors when 
 
 277 See Kelly Thompson Cochran, The CFPB at Five Years: Beyond the Numbers, 21 N.C. 
Banking Inst. 55, 70–71 (2017). 
278 See J. Scott Colesanti, Demanding Substance or Form? The SEC’s Plain English 
Handbook as a Basis for Securities Violations, 18 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 95, 95 (2012); 
Firtel, supra note 116, at 880. 
279 See Firtel, supra note 116, at 879–80. 
280 See id. at 879–81.  
281 See Will Bunting, The Trouble with Investment Banking: Cluelessness, Not Greed, 48 
San Diego L. Rev. 993, 995–97 (2011); see also Regulation Best Interest, 83 Fed. Reg. 
21574 (proposed Apr. 18, 2018) (to be codified at 17 C.F.R. pt. 240); Mark Schoeff, Jr., SEC 
Advice Rule Raises Bar for Brokers by Putting ‘Best Interest’ on Table, InvestmentNews 
(Apr. 19, 2018), http://www.investmentnews.com/article/20180419/FREE/180419899/sec-
advice-rule-raises-bar-for-brokers-by-putting-best-interest-on [https://perma.cc/3F7E-
5ASY]; John A. Turner, et. al., Pension Policy Center, Financial Illiteracy Meets Conflicted 
Advice: The Case of Thrift Savings Plan Rollovers 1–2 (May 2015), http://www.pension 
rights.org/sites/default/files/docs/150501_financial_illiteracy_meets_conflicted_advice.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/H8R3-HWHQ]. 
COPYRIGHT © 2018 VIRGINIA LAW REVIEW ASSOCIATION 
2018] The Securities Law Implications of Financial Illiteracy 1117 
they are choosing among investment products.282 The financial literacy 
data reveals that these areas are critical not only because the lack of 
financial literacy among investors suggests an increased need for 
appropriate financial intermediaries, but also because investors 
encounter particular difficulties with making decisions about appropriate 
and suitable investment products.283 Hence, this Article supports efforts 
at reforms focused on advisors. 
In addition, this Article contends that our focus on advisors should 
delve into several specific areas. First, special attention must be given to 
the access and availability of advisors.284 Financial illiteracy means that 
investors need the help of advisors. Thus, reforms must be developed to 
enhance availability, while any existing rules, regulations, or reforms 
must be evaluated to ensure that they do not unduly burden investors’ 
access to advisors. Second, advising must be free from conflicts of 
interests.285 We must pay special attention to ensuring that investor 
advice is independent and unbiased. 
Third, we must evaluate how best to grapple with investors’ 
inevitable overreliance on advisors. Studies reveal that investors rely on 
their financial advisors more than any other source.286 Studies also reveal 
that investors rely on their financial advisors even in circumstances 
when they likely should not, such as when there are serious concerns 
around conflicts of interest.287 Studies further reveal that investors rely 
on individuals who engage with them in the process of selecting 
investments even when those individuals do not take on the 
responsibility for advising them.288 Finally, studies reveal that some 
 
282 See Turner, et al., supra note 281, at 1–2.  
283 See Elan, supra note 1, at 5, 25. 
284 See Ben-Shahar & Schneider, supra note 148, at 747–48. 
285 See id. at 747. 
286 Elan, supra note 1, at 22.  
287 See Chrissy Celaya, Conflicts of Interest Can be Buried Deep in Your Investing 
Choices, Betterment (June 19, 2017), https://www.betterment.com/resources/conflicts-of-
interest-investing/ [https://perma.cc/7J8L-5U4R]; Daniel Solin, Investors Should Look Out 
for Conflicts of Interest, U.S. News (May 5, 2014), https://money.usnews. 
com/money/blogs/the-smarter-mutual-fund-investor/2014/05/05/investors-should-look-out-
for-conflicts-of-interest. Although investors express high satisfaction with their financial 
advisors, they are confused and uncertain about fees and fee structure. See Angela A. Hung 
et al., RAND Inst. for Civil Justice, Investor and Industry Perspective on Investment 
Advisers and Broker-Dealers xix (2008), https://www .sec.gov/news/press/2008/2008-
1_randiabdreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/6GT7-YMT2]. As other studies suggest, fees reflect a 
potential conflict of interest. 
288 See Hung at al., supra note 287, at 113. 
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investors do not investigate their advisor’s background or credentials.289 
Viewed together, these studies indicate that financial illiteracy may 
create undue reliance on financial professionals. That reliance is 
particularly problematic in light of the current environment surrounding 
financial and securities professionals. Investors engage with financial 
professionals who have different roles and responsibilities towards 
investors.290 Research suggests that investors do not sufficiently 
understand those differences.291 Current reform measures, including 
reforms aimed at imposing a uniform fiduciary duty rule for investors,292 
seek to ensure that investors understand the difference between the 
professionals on whom they can rely for advice and professionals who 
have other roles in the process and thus do not have responsibility for 
providing investment advice.293 The financial literacy data suggests that 
this may not be sufficient. Instead, we may have to assume that investors 
will rely on all professionals precisely because they do not have the 
capacity to make decisions on their own, and then design reform efforts 
aimed at addressing this inevitable reliance. The concerns surrounding 
financial literacy suggest that reform efforts related to the fiduciary duty 
of financial professionals must not only focus on reducing confusion 
about the role of financial professionals, but also must appropriately 
acknowledge the reality of investor reliance as it applies to all financial 
professionals.294 Thus, whether or not we embrace a uniform fiduciary 
standard, we must think carefully about appropriate mechanisms for 
acknowledging the reality of overreliance that appears to be the 
inevitable byproduct of financial illiteracy. 
Fourth, we should grapple with how best to deal with the concern 
regarding investors’ failure to seek out advice. The evidence reveals that 
investors are not likely to believe that they need advice or otherwise to 
 
289 See Elan, supra note 1, at 22.   
290 See Ryan K. Bakhtiari, Katrina Boice & Jeffrey S. Majors, The Time for a Uniform 
Fiduciary Duty Is Now, 87 St. John’s L. Rev. 313, 315–16 (2013); Art Gharibian, Applying 
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William Nelson, Broker-Dealer: A Fiduciary by Any Other Name?, 20 Fordham J. Corp. & 
Fin. L. 637, 648 (2015).  
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293 See Gharibian, supra note 290, at 8; Nelson, supra note 290, at 689–90. 
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reliance); Nelson, supra note 290, at 689. 
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seek out that advice.295 Indeed, even when investors are offered financial 
information or financial advice from their employers, investors routinely 
fail to take advantage of such offerings. This means we must develop 
and advance solutions that seek to proactively bring the advice to the 
investors. 
Finally, we must pay particular attention to advice around certain 
types of decisions. Importantly, the financial literacy literature reveals 
that financial education and advising are best when delivered at 
“teachable” moments, when the information is applicable to a particular 
decision.296 This means that effective investor education and effective 
delivery of investment advice requires that such education be delivered 
at the point when investors are making a relevant investment decision. 
Thus, we must devise measures to intervene at these important decision 
making points. 
Advising is not a cure-all. As Lusardi and her colleagues note, 
advising cannot do all of the work associated with responding to 
financial literacy concerns.297 Indeed, they observe that “receiving 
advice and nudges on every financial decision that individuals face is 
simply not realistic.”298 Moreover, even if it were realistic, or we could 
enhance advice around certain key decisional moments, such actions 
would not fully address financial literacy concerns. This is because 
individuals need to be proactive participants in their advice sessions in 
order to get the best benefit and most suitable advice.299 Professional 
financial advice is most effective when investors have the capacity to 
understand it and tailor it for their specific needs and circumstances.300 
Investors’ active participation is also important because we cannot 
ensure that all advice is unbiased and objective. Lusardi and her 
colleagues contend that additional guidance from professional advisors 
is best viewed as a complement to improved investor education in this 
 
 295 Financial Capability in the United States 2016, supra note 20, at 31–32; Angrisani et al., 
supra note 1, at 40. 
296 See GAO Forum, supra note 4, at 10. 
297 See Lusardi et al., A New Measure, supra note 1, at 20.  
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area.301 However, in light of the limitations of investor education, 
advising is clearly an area that merits special attention. 
E. Literacy and the Exercise of Shareholder Power 
On the one hand, the financial literacy problem suggests that we 
should reduce the areas in which investors must make critical investment 
decisions. Such a conclusion may not bode well for those investors who 
have advocated for increased shareholder power and influence over 
corporate affairs. Indeed, in the last decade investors have pushed for, 
and been granted, considerably more influence over corporate affairs on 
issues ranging from executive compensation decisions to the nomination 
and election of directors.302 There has been considerable debate over the 
benefits of such an increase.303 Financial illiteracy may provide support 
for opponents of such an increase by suggesting that investors do not 
have the capacity to responsibly exercise their influence. 
However, it is not clear that financial illiteracy dictates a reduction in 
shareholder influence, at least as it has currently evolved. To be sure, in 
order to responsibly exercise their increased power and authority, 
investors clearly need to be well informed about a range of issues, 
including financial matters. But there may be reasons why financial 
illiteracy is not as concerning in the context of the current shareholder 
activism environment. Indeed, the very fact that shareholders have 
vociferously advocated for increased power around particular issues may 
mean that shareholders are especially motivated and incentivized to seek 
advice and gain understanding of the issues around which they have 
gained more authority. Indeed, evidence suggests that shareholders have 
both the expertise and the incentive to make informed decisions about 
the particular issues around which they must exercise enhanced 
authority.304 Of note, the financial literacy literature does not suggest 
that investors experience difficulty making decisions on all matters 
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impacting the corporation or the market. Thus, the literature may have 
particular relevance for decisions implicating financial concerns, but 
does not speak to decisions about other issues. Many of the areas around 
which shareholders have greater influence do not directly involve 
financial matters, or otherwise implicate decisions around which 
shareholders have experienced the most difficulty as a result of their 
lack of financial literacy.305 Hence, the financial literacy problem does 
not necessarily undermine the movement towards increased shareholder 
power. 
Of course, there are a host of other issues implicated by financial 
illiteracy. This Article is just a starting point in considering how such 
illiteracy may impact our understanding of issues pertinent to the 
securities law regime. More work needs to be done to ensure that we 
better understand, acknowledge, and grapple with the securities law 
implications of financial illiteracy. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Studies conclusively and consistently reveal that Americans lack 
basic understanding of financial concepts and how to effectively apply 
those concepts in financial decision making. Those studies also reveal 
that the American investor is no exception. This Article seeks to sound 
the alarm about the clear and consistent findings surrounding financial 
illiteracy in the United States. 
Financial illiteracy poses challenges to our securities system, because 
our system is premised almost entirely on the ability of investors to 
understand disclosures and make investment decisions based on those 
disclosures. While those challenges have not gone unnoticed, we may 
have inappropriately minimized the extent and nature of those 
challenges. However, this Article reveals the flaws associated with the 
effort to minimize the financial literacy problem. Financial literacy 
should not be thought of as an issue impacting solely retail investors, nor 
should it be viewed as insignificant based on the presumption that retail 
investors can rely on more sophisticated institutions and financial 
intermediaries. Perhaps more importantly, this Article demonstrates that 
the financial literacy problem cannot be sufficiently ameliorated based 
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on presumptions about the sophistication of financial institutions and 
intermediaries. Collectively, therefore, this Article undermines the 
presumptions that have caused us to inappropriately minimize the 
significance of the financial literacy problem in the context of the 
federal securities regime. As a result, this Article reveals the importance 
of financial illiteracy to the overall health of the federal securities 
regime, as well as the need to seriously enhance the attention paid to the 
issue of financial literacy and its impact on that regime. 
This Article also asserts that we may have zeroed in on a solution—
financial education—that has not, and in the near-term and as currently 
constructed likely cannot, produce appreciable changes to financial 
literacy rates. To be sure, this Article supports the financial education 
effort, but acknowledges its limitations. Moreover, this Article argues 
that we must address the financial literacy problem with multiple 
solutions, rather than zeroing in on one. This Article therefore insists 
that we grapple with the financial literacy issue from a different 
perspective so that we can make more realistic and meaningful 
adjustments to our securities law regime. Americans are financially 
illiterate. It is past time that we seriously consider how our disclosure-
based securities regime should account for that fact. 
